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ABSTRACT 
This Article argues that the evolution of software—and the looming age 
of the “Internet of Things”—will allow manufacturers to make use of 
consumer monitoring technologies and restrictive software licenses to 
price discriminate more perfectly. First, the increasing communication 
between software and its producers gives more opportunities to monitor 
consumer behavior and characteristics. Second, attaching restrictive 
copyright licenses to software—and to goods containing software—enables 
producers to restrict use and resale of their products. By combining 
monitoring and restrictive licensing, producers will have increasingly 
better ability and opportunities to price discriminate among their 
consumers. 
This Article explains that increased monitoring and price 
discrimination will not always happen because, in some cases, it will be 
against the manufacturers’ financial interests. But in other cases, 
manufacturers will indeed restrict use of products to facilitate price 
discrimination. The Article argues that the low marginal cost of 
distribution of software makes it more likely that price discrimination of 
software-enabled goods will be welfare enhancing and will result in cross-
subsidization from rich to poor so that poor consumers can get more 
products for lower prices. The Article also demonstrates that the 
traditional policy reasons to disallow restraints on personal property do 
not apply to software-enabled devices. We conclude that rather than 
discouraging the use of restrictive software licenses, the law should adapt 
to better facilitate such licenses and the more perfect price discrimination 
that goes with them. 
INTRODUCTION 
Mattel, Inc. recently released the “Hello Barbie,” a doll for our 
interconnected times, designed to have interactive conversations with the 
child to whom it belongs.1 To accomplish this, the doll comes with built-in 
hardware and software that allows her to “listen” to the conversations 
around her, record them, and send them back to Mattel via a WiFi 
connection to the Internet.2 Mattel says it analyzes these conversations to 
 
1.  See Katie Lobosco, Talking Barbie is Too ‘Creepy’ for Some Parents, CNNMONEY (Mar. 12, 
2015, 4:11 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/03/11/news/companies/creepy-hello-barbie/; James 
Vlahos, Barbie Wants to Get to Know Your Child, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2015, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/20/magazine/barbie-wants-to-get-to-know-your-child.html?_r=0. 
2.  See id. Hello Barbie is one of many technologically enabled items intended for use involving 
children. See, e.g., Parija Kavilanz, ‘Connected’ Babies = More Sleep for You, CNNMONEY (Apr. 17, 
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learn more about the doll’s playmate over time so that it can provide better 
conversations and the doll can become the child’s “best friend.”3 
Hello Barbie has provoked controversy. Some people worry about a 
doll that records everything around it and sends the recordings to a 
corporation for analysis.4 They worry that Mattel will receive personal 
information never intended to be shared and use this information to create 
extensive data profiles of the household for advertising and other purposes. 
Others simply call the doll “creepy.”5 
 
2015, 6:52 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/04/16/smallbusiness/mimo-wearable-baby-monitor/ 
index.html?iid=ob_homepage_tech_pool&iid=obnetwork (describing sleepwear for babies designed to 
help parents monitor their activities); Hope King, Google Files Patent for Creepy Teddy Bear, 
CNNMONEY (May 22, 2015, 6:37 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/05/22/technology/google-doll-toy-
connected-device-patent/index.html?iid=ob_homepage_tech_pool&iid=obnetwork (discussing stuffed 
animal that tracks users and follows voice command prompts). 
3.  See Lobosco, supra note 1. 
4.  See Stephanie Mlot, Hey Barbie, Are You Invading My Privacy?, PC MAG. (Mar. 11, 2015, 
3:36 PM), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2478159,00.asp. Similar issues came up when 
concerns arose that the Samsung SmartTV was reporting on watchers’ behaviors. Shane Harris, Your 
Samsung SmartTV Is Spying on You, Basically, DAILY BEAST (Feb. 5, 2015, 7:35 PM), http://www. 
thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/02/05/your-samsung-smarttv-is-spying-on-you-basically.html. There 
was some question as to whether people understood the license terms in this context. See April Glaser, 
Philip K. Dick Warned Us About the Internet of Things in 1969, SLATE (Feb. 10, 2015, 5:27 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2015/02/10/philip_k_dick_s_1969_novel_ubik_on_the_intern
et_of_things.html. Recently, AT&T made news when it became public that the company was offering 
Internet service at a higher price for individuals who wished for a higher level of protection of their 
privacy. Jon Brodkin, AT&T Charges $29 More for Gigabit Fiber That Doesn’t Watch Your Web 
Browsing, ARS TECHNICA (Feb. 16, 2015, 11:38 PM) http://arstechnica.com/business/2015/02/att-
charges-29-more-for-gigabit-fiber-that-doesnt-watch-your-web-browsing/. Critics believed that 
consumers should not be put to this choice. Sophia Cope & Jeremy Gillula, AT&T Is Putting a Price on 
Privacy. That Is Outrageous, GUARDIAN (Feb. 20, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/ 
2015/feb/20/att-price-on-privacy?CMP. For a related discussion of individuals’ worth to online 
advertisers, see Dave Jeffers, The Internet of Things and the Currency of Privacy, PCWORLD (Feb. 17, 
2015, 10:05 AM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/2871482/ the-internet-of-things-and-the-currency-
of-privacy.html [http://web.archive.org/web/20150324000822/http://www.pcworld.com/article/ 
2871482/the-internet-of-things-and-the-currency-of-privacy.html]. Companies like Facebook are 
seeking to increase the facility with which developers can understand consumer behavior in these 
contexts. See, e.g., Hope King, 7 Big Changes Coming to Facebook, CNNMONEY (Mar. 25, 2015, 4:27 
PM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/03/25/technology/facebook-f8-messenger/index.html (discussing a 
new dashboard function that will allow developers to see the identity and location of app users across 
devices). A different app called Sherbit focuses on giving individuals the ability to pool their data 
across devices for their personal use. See SHERBIT, https://www.sherbit.io/ (last visited Sept. 28, 2015). 
Some have called for a radical change of privacy practices related to such technologies. See, e.g., Jacob 
Silverman, Big Data’s Big Libertarian Lie: Facebook, Google, and the Silicon Valley Ethical Overhaul 
We Need, SALON (Apr. 26, 2015, 11:00 AM), http://www.salon.com/2015/04/26/big_datas_big_ 
libertarian_lie_facebook_google_and_the_silicon_valley_ethical_overhaul_we_need/. See generally 
BRUCE SCHNEIER, DATA AND GOLIATH: THE HIDDEN BATTLES TO COLLECT YOUR DATA AND 
CONTROL YOUR WORLD 91–151 (2015) (explaining how the electronic collection of data threatens 
political liberty and justice, commercial fairness and equality, business competiveness, privacy, and 
security). 
5.  See Sarah Halzack, Privacy Advocates Try to Keep ‘Creepy,’ ‘Eavesdropping’ Hello Barbie 
from Hitting Shelves, WASH. POST (Mar. 11, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
switch/wp/2015/03/11/privacy-advocates-try-to-keep-creepy-eavesdropping-hello-barbie-from-hitting-
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Hello Barbie conforms to the image many people have of the way 
mundane objects will be able to monitor and report to their creators as we 
enter the age of the “Internet of Things.”6 We believe that the 
 
shelves/. For a general discussion of intellectual property law issues that have arisen in the context of 
Barbie, see Rebecca Tushnet, Make Me Walk, Make Me Talk, Do Whatever You Please: Barbie and 
Exceptions, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AT THE EDGE 405 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Jane C. 
Ginsburg eds., 2014). The issue of undesired reporting of private individual activity has come up in a 
number of related contexts. See, e.g., Spencer E. Ante & Lauren Weber, Memo to Workers: The Boss Is 
Watching, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 22, 2013), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405270230367240 
4579151440488919138 (describing technology-driven workplace tracking of employee behavior); Brett 
Hambright, Woman Staged ‘Rape’ Scene with Knife, Vodka, Called 9-1-1, Police Say, 
LANCASTERONLINE (June 19, 2015), http://lancasteronline.com/news/local/woman-staged-rape-scene-
with-knife-vodka-called—/article_9295bdbe-167c-11e5-b6eb-07d1288cc937.html (describing how a 
woman’s Fitbit activity data, which revealed that she was awake and walking around at a time she 
claimed to have been asleep, was used to show that she had staged a crime scene and made a false 
police report); Kashmir Hill, Fitbit Moves Quickly After Users’ Sex Stats Exposed, FORBES (July 5, 
2011, 7:58 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2011/07/05/fitbit-moves-quickly-after-users-
sex-stats-exposed/ (discussing how users of the activity tracker Fitbit accidentally publicly disclosed the 
frequency and duration of sexual intercourse). This is an important issue in a world in which individuals 
track increasingly diverse and private data. See, e.g., Sarah Perez, Bellabeat Starts Shipping the Leaf, a 
Health Tracker Designed for Women, TECHCRUNCH (May 27, 2015), http://techcrunch.com/2015/05/ 
27/bellabeat-starts-shipping-the-leaf-a-health-tracker-designed-for-women/ (discussing a Fitbit-type 
device that monitors women’s fertility). That said, in some legal contexts, personal tracking has allowed 
users to back up the truthfulness of their statements. See, e.g., Parmy Olson, Fitbit Data Now Being 
Used in the Courtroom, FORBES, Nov. 16, 2014, http://www.forbes.com/sites/parmyolson/ 
2014/11/16/fitbit-data-court-room-personal-injury-claim/ (showing how a personal injury case relied on 
Fitbit data that illustrated a victim’s claims of a significant drop in activity levels before and after an 
accident). 
6.  This term refers to the near-future world in which many devices that were not formerly 
computerized and networked will be connected to the Internet and will communicate with other devices, 
as well as with device owners and manufacturers. See, e.g., Scott R. Peppet, Regulating the Internet of 
Things: First Steps Toward Managing Discrimination, Privacy, Security, and Consent, 93 TEX. L. REV. 
85, 87–89 (2014) (explaining the functioning of the Internet of Things). Some are concerned that the 
risks of monitoring as part of the Internet of Things will go up as devices increasingly interact with the 
human body. See, e.g., The Real-Life Matrix: MIT Researchers Reveal Interface That Can Allow a 
Computer to Plug into the Brain, DAILYMAIL.COM, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-
2927410/The-real-life-Matrix-MIT-researchers-reveal-interface-allow-computer-plug-brain.html (last 
visited Sept. 28, 2015); Bonnie Burton, Swedish Office Gets Under Employees’ Skin with RFID 
Microchips, CNET (Feb. 3, 2015, 5:10 AM), http://www.cnet.com/news/swedish-office-gets-under-
employees-skin-with-rfid-microchips/; Max Plenke, Scientists Are Building a 3-D Printed Eyeball That 
Can Record Your Vision, TECH.MIC (Apr. 23, 2015), http://mic.com/articles/116150/scientists-are-
building-a-3-d-printed-eyeball-that-can-record-your-vision. Some others view these possibilities with 
cautious optimism. See, e.g., Biz Carson, They Hacked Her Pancreas and Found Love Along the Way, 
BUSINESS INSIDER, Aug. 27, 2015, http://www.businessinsider.com/hacked-raspberry-pi-artificial-
pancreas-2015-8 (describing an artificial pancreas in this context); John Dodge, Study: Smart Phones 
Accurately Detect Depression, CBS CHICAGO (July 16, 2015, 10:23 AM), 
http://chicago.cbslocal.com/2015/07/16/study-smart-phones-accurately-detect-depression/ (describing 
the use of smartphones to diagnose depression); Jillian Eugenios, Ray Kurzweil: Humans Will Be 
Hybrids by 2030, CNNMONEY (June 4, 2015, 12:26 PM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2015/06/03/technology/ray-kurzweil-predictions/index.html?iid=obnetwork 
(discussing how Google’s director of engineering believes that human thinking will advance as a result 
of being able to connect directly to the cloud within the next fifteen years). Some are also developing 
apps to unleash the ability of the Internet of Things to increase personal security. See, e.g., Mary-Ann 
Russon, A New App that Lets Users’ Friends ‘Virtually Walk Them Home at Night’ Is Exploding in 
Popularity, BUSINESS INSIDER, Sept. 3, 2015, http://www.businessinsider.com/campanion-app-surging-
 
3 MANTA AND OLSON 135-187 (DO NOT DELETE) 11/5/2015  8:50 AM 
2015] Hello Barbie 139 
interconnection of consumer products and increased monitoring of users—
while regrettable at times7—is almost inevitable, in large part because 
consumers so often are willing to trade being monitored for receiving 
products and applications that they like.8 In addition, the coming ubiquity 
of software in consumer products will give manufacturers a unique 
opportunity to exert post-sale control of their products.9 Because courts 
have accepted that software can be licensed rather than sold to consumers, 
owners of copyrights in software can place numerous post-sale restrictions 
on the use of the software.10 Some worry that manufacturers of consumer 
products will adopt this methodology and try to restrict uses of consumer 
products via software licenses.11 These skeptics believe that manufacturers 
will restrict consumers’ use of, and ability to alienate, the products that 
consumers buy and formerly could do with as they pleased.12 
To prevent the pervasive use of post-sale restrictions on software and 
consumer products, some commentators argue that common law 
restrictions on equitable servitudes on personal property should be revived 
and applied to the coming Internet of Things.13 According to this theory, 
only by stopping companies from using software licenses to restrict use of 
consumer products can we protect consumers’ traditional rights to do with 
their property what they like. This Article agrees that the evolution of 
software and the monitoring that will be possible in the looming Internet of 
 
in-popularity-2015-9. For a critical take on some of these developments, see generally Brett M. 
Frischmann, Human-Focused Turing Tests: A Framework for Judging and Techno-Social Engineering 
of Human Beings, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2499760. 
7.  See, e.g., SCHNEIER, supra note 4, at 123–24 (discussing studies—albeit ones relying on self-
report—suggesting that customers would spend more if they felt that their privacy was protected). See 
generally Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy Wrongs in Search of Remedies, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 877 (2003); 
Joel R. Reidenberg et al., Privacy Harms and the Effectiveness of the Notice and Choice Framework, 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2418247. 
8.  See, e.g., Jasmin Melvin, ‘Do Not Track’ Internet Spat Risks Legislative Crackdown, REUTERS 
(July 23, 2012, 4:05 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/23/internet-tracking-idUSL2E8 
IN7YG20120723 (explaining the potential tradeoffs between privacy and access to free web content). 
9.  For example, to provide post-sale service and increase revenue, Amazon is launching a 
product called the Dash Button that consumers can attach to their pantries, washing machines, or 
refrigerators that will alert Amazon when consumers need refills or reorders. See Nathan Olivarez-
Giles, Amazon’s Dash Button Is Not a Hoax, It’s Phase One, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 31, 2015, 4:11 PM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/personal-technology/2015/03/31/amazons-dash-button-is-not-a-hoax-its-phase-
one/. Another recent innovation seeks to help consumers regulate cooking temperature through the use 
of sensors. See Nick Wingfield, With Meld, Another Step Toward the Internet of Tasty Things, N.Y. 
TIMES BITS, (Apr. 7, 2015, 9:00 AM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/04/07/with-meld-another-
step-toward-the-internet-of-tasty-things/?_r=0. Some of the technology used as part of the Internet of 
Things has been subverted for activities such as spam attacks. See Michelle Starr, Fridge Caught 
Sending Spam Emails in Botnet Attack, CNET (Jan. 19, 2014, 4:53 PM), http://www.cnet.com/news/ 
fridge-caught-sending-spam-emails-in-botnet-attack/. 
10.  See infra Part II. 
11.  See infra Part II. 
12.  See infra Part IV. 
13.  See infra Part IV. 
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Things will allow producers of software and consumer products to restrict 
the use of software and products as never before. This Article takes a novel 
and contrarian view, however, and explains how this increased ability to 
restrict use will, in many cases, be beneficial. 
For pure software products, the increased ability to monitor use will 
allow companies to better determine consumer reservation prices,14 price 
discriminate, and prevent arbitrage. These companies increasingly will be 
able to perfect their price discrimination. This increasingly perfect price 
discrimination will allow companies to discount software prices for poorer 
consumers.15 Richer software users will subsidize these low prices because 
they will be charged more by software companies utilizing price 
discrimination. This Article explains that it can be particularly beneficial to 
the economy and to poorer consumers for the law to facilitate more perfect 
price discrimination for products like software for which the marginal cost 
of distribution is extremely low. 
This Article examines the coming Internet of Things and shows why 
most companies will not take advantage of their greater ability to restrict 
uses of their physical products because doing so would go against the 
companies’ financial interests. The Article argues that, in some cases, 
companies will limit uses of their products to facilitate price discrimination. 
This price discrimination will also enhance cross-subsidization from rich to 
poor so that poor consumers can get more products for lower prices. The 
magnitude of the benefit will not be as large as it is for purely digital 
products—because the marginal cost of consumer products is greater than 
the marginal cost of digital products—but it will still likely increase total 
welfare in society. 
The Article scrutinizes arguments for disallowing companies from 
using software licenses to restrict uses of their software and products. The 
traditional policy reasons that historically led courts not to enforce 
restraints on use and alienation of personal property were that the 
transaction and information costs of enforcement would have been too 
high. The Article demonstrates that these costs are becoming quite low 
when it comes to pure software and software-enabled products, and thus 
the policy reasons for which the courts did not enforce restrictions on 
personal property do not apply to software. The Article concludes with a 
warning against lawmaking and legal interpretations that disallow using 
 
14.  A consumer’s reservation price is the highest price a consumer is willing to pay for a good. 
See, e.g., Russell Korobkin, Aspirations and Settlement, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 2 (2002). 
15.  See generally M. Todd Henderson, Letter to the Editor, How Perks Help the Masses, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 26, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/26/opinion/how-perks-help-the-masses.html 
(“The reason that businesses offer ‘first-class lounges’ is not that they like rich people better; it is that it 
allows them to charge rich people more, which in turn helps poorer people enjoy the services.”). 
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software licenses to facilitate restraints on use and alienation. Instead, a 
legal regime that facilitates such restrictions to prevent arbitrage will allow 
more socially optimal price discrimination to the benefit of the economy 
and consumers. To the extent that some customers dislike the privacy 
implications of the monitoring tied to licensed software, they will have the 
same choices as parents do regarding Hello Barbie—which is to buy a 
specific product or not. 
Part I describes the history of the limitations on equitable servitudes for 
personal property. Part II analyzes how courts have treated attempts to 
license software over time. Part III explains how software licensing enables 
price discrimination in ways that may ultimately benefit society. Part IV 
shows how restrictive software licensing can advance social welfare in the 
age of the Internet of Things. Part V concludes. 
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF EQUITABLE SERVITUDES FOR PERSONAL 
PROPERTY 
This Part discusses the origins of the limitations on equitable servitudes 
for personal property that we see today. This allows us to lay the 
foundation for understanding the relationship between rights in “real” 
versus intellectual property and distinguishing the rules that apply to each. 
The American and English property laws in place today date back to 
the Roman Empire and the Norman Conquest of 1066.16 Anglo-Saxon laws 
of feudalism merged with the Roman laws of citizenship to create the 
foundation of real and personal property laws.17 As populations grew and 
communities expanded, the finite resources of land became more 
precious.18 Over time, occupants of the land fought for the freedom to pass 
the land to their heirs and to assign rights to occupy, farm, or use the land 
without the local lord’s consent.19 By the end of the thirteenth century, that 
interest was determined to be “freely alienable.”20 As a result, the landed 
gentry employed means to keep the land in their own families and out of 
the hands of its occupants.21 Courts of chancery began recognizing 
restraints on land use, developing what would come to be known as the life 
 
16.  See JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 185 (7th ed. 2010). 
17.  See Yun-chien Chang & Henry E. Smith, An Economic Analysis of Civil Versus Common 
Law Property, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 7–9 (2012). 
18.  See id. 
19.  See Chad J. Pomeroy, The Shape of Property, 44 SETON HALL L. REV. 797, 821–22 (2014). 
20.  DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 16, at 193; see Pomeroy, supra note 19, at 820–23. 
21.  See Pomeroy, supra note 19, at 820–23. 
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estate,22 which allowed lords to give the right to certain persons to live and 
work on the land but prevented the occupants from transferring their usage 
rights to others.23 The life estate allowed an occupancy interest to revert to 
the landowner’s family upon the death of the occupant, effectively keeping 
the land in the family for centuries.24 As discontent grew, courts recognized 
more ways in which the landowner could allow others to use his property 
without giving up possession. Easements and covenants, adopted from the 
Roman civil law system, began to emerge as means of granting or denying 
permission for temporary land use while maintaining ownership in the 
hands of the lords.25 Even early colonial land and agricultural development 
systems were based upon the medieval profits à prendre system, wherein 
members of a community had rights to take from the land, but such takings 
required approval of the community.26 While the (primarily) common law 
property system in America developed alongside, and as a result of, the 
English property system, certain variances between the two systems arose, 
due in part to the colonies’ rejection of servitudes, which were perceived to 
be remnants of the monarchy.27 As the common law slowly 
metamorphosed over the centuries, laws regarding the ownership of 
“things,” or chattel, developed in tandem. With the right to use land came 
the right to use and possess items found on that land, such as wildlife, 
timber, and even treasure.28 In a classic example of early American 
property law, the critical question of who owned the fox once it was hunted 
 
22.  The life estate concept may actually relate as far back as the Norman Conquest in the form of 
tenure. For a discussion on the possible origins of the English life estate and land tenure, see Frederick 
C. Bryan, Origin of English Land Tenures, 40 AM. L. REV. 9, 23–24 (1906). 
23.  See Percy Bordwell, The Common Law Scheme of Estates, 18 IOWA L. REV. 425, 428 (1933). 
24.  This common practice of keeping land from passing outside the family is what led, in part, to 
the rule against perpetuities in trusts and estates law. The first judicial rejection of a lord’s attempt to tie 
up land for generations beyond those currently living, which set the stage for the rule against 
perpetuities, can be found in the Duke of Norfolk’s Case, (1682) 22 Eng. Rep. 931, 3 Ch. Cas. 1. See 
Herbert Barry, The Duke of Norfolk’s Case, 23 VA. L. REV. 538, 539 (1937). The rule against 
perpetuities is closely related to the rule against unreasonable restraint on alienation, both of which are 
beyond the scope of this Article. 
25.  For a discussion of the Roman influence on English easement common law, see BARRY 
NICHOLAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 148 (H.L.A. Hart ed., 1962). See generally Jonathan 
Gaunt & Paul Morgan, GALE ON EASEMENTS (18th ed. 2012). 
26.  See 7 WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 319–21 (1925); see also 
Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1389 (1993) (graphically depicting the 
typical land distribution in a profits à prendre system). 
27.  See Chang & Smith, supra note 17, at 39. 
28.  In fact, four separate and distinct types of property—lost, mislaid, treasure trove, and 
abandoned—challenge the famous adage “finders keepers” and can affect the determination of who is 
entitled to a treasure once it is “found.” For a general discussion of types of property, see DUKEMINIER 
ET AL., supra note 16, at 108–15, and Donald J. Kochan, The Property Platform in Anglo-American 
Law and the Primacy of the Property Concept, 29 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 453, 466–67 (2013). 
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down on another’s property would tie together the complex issues of right 
of acquisition by capture, implied easements, and trespass.29 
As the Industrial Revolution began to alter the legal and social views of 
property use and possession,30 land became more sought after while at the 
same time “things” became more prevalent (and fungible).31 As legal 
doctrines surrounding restrictions on use of personal property and real 
property developed, a puzzling delineation emerged. While the “primary 
modern forms of servitudes—easements, real covenants, and equitable 
servitudes—[were] largely products of the nineteenth century,”32 it is worth 
noting that these same restraints were not typically applied to personal 
property. The question is, why are certain alienations permitted on real 
property but not applicable to personal property? And in the few instances 
where alienation is permitted, such as in copyright and patent law, what is 
unique about intellectual property that should cause it to be treated more 
akin to real property than chattels? 
Certain interests that can be conveyed in real property, such as future 
interests, reverters, and contingent remainders, are loosely applicable to 
personal property, but generally only as they relate to trusts, stocks, and 
future profits.33 Other equitable interests, however, such as judicially 
created equitable servitudes,34 do not typically apply to personal property.35 
The question remains unsettled as to whether life estates may attach to 
personal property.36 While numerous articles address the fact that these 
 
29.  See Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805). 
30.  For example, the effect of the Industrial Revolution on the law included the development of a 
relatively new subclass of tort law—nuisance law. See generally Joel Franklin Brenner, Nuisance Law 
and the Industrial Revolution, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 403 (1974); John P.S. McLaren, Nuisance Law and the 
Industrial Revolution—Some Lessons from Social History, 3 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 155 (1983). 
31.  See David A. Super, A New New Property, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1773, 1776 (2013). 
32.  DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 16, at 766. 
33.  See John Chipman Gray, Future Interests in Personal Property, 14 HARV. L. REV. 397, 406–
08, 419–20 (1901) (arguing that future interests can be created in personal property, primarily through 
will or deed). 
34.  See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: 
The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 16–17 (2000) (“[T]he English Court of Chancery, in 
Tulk v. Moxhay [(1848) 41 Eng. Rep. 1143; 2 Ph. 774], in effect created a new interest [on real 
property]—the equitable servitude.”). 
35.  See id., at 18 (“[A]lthough the case law is rather thin, it . . . appears that one cannot create 
servitudes in personal property.”). Shortly after the creation of the equitable servitude in land, the 
English Chancery court held explicitly that equitable servitudes would not apply to chattels. Taddy & 
Co. v. Sterious & Co. [1904] 1 Ch. 354 at 358 (holding conditions of sale imposed by the manufacturer 
of tobacco on the retailer were invalid because “[c]onditions of this kind do not run with goods, and 
cannot be imposed upon them. Subsequent purchasers, therefore, do not take subject to any condition 
which the court can enforce.”). For a discussion of Taddy, see Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Equitable 
Servitudes on Chattels, 41 HARV. L. REV. 945, 977–80 (1928). 
36.  Merrill & Smith, supra note 34, at 17–18 (“[T]here are few if any cases that address the 
question of whether more exotic interests, such as defeasible fees and executory interests, can be 
created in personal property.”). 
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differences exist,37 few have advanced theories that definitively explain the 
reasons for such disparities.38 Though it has been argued that “[t]he law has 
always been more suspicious of personal than real property servitudes,”39 
this suspicion alone is not enough to explain why courts and legislatures 
treat different types of property in such different fashion. If one is to adhere 
to the “bundle of sticks” concept and its associated rights of ownership, it 
would stand to reason that all types of property should be subjected to the 
same rights and restrictions.40 Certain theorists have posited that the 
mobility, the fungibility, and the relatively small size of chattels account 
for the different treatments.41 Others have theorized that the very portability 
of an item of personal property would support restraints on personal 
property due to the ease with which restraints could be applied and 
transferred from owner to owner.42  
Additional theories regarding the courts’ general rejections of 
servitudes on chattels range from “considerations of competition policy 
[rather than concerns of] notice,”43 to the possibility of a complete lack of 
 
37.  See, e.g., Chafee, supra note 35; Merrill & Smith, supra note 34; Glen O. Robinson, 
Personal Property Servitudes, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1449, 1455–57 (2004); Molly Shaffer Van 
Houweling, The New Servitudes, 96 GEO. L.J. 885, 906–10 (2008). 
38.  The most convincing piece of which we are aware that has analyzed the differences is 
Christina M. Mulligan, The Cost of Personal Property Servitudes: Lessons for the Internet of Things, 50 
GA. L. REV. (forthcoming), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2465651 (arguing that 
information costs are higher for chattels and software-embedded goods and that this should lead to 
suspiciousness of licenses or servitudes on them). On rare occasions, which are typically held to be one-
off exceptions to the rule, courts have seen fit to recognize certain servitudes on chattels. See, e.g., 
Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Commentary, The Music Goes Round and Round: Equitable Servitudes and 
Chattels, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1250, 1255 (1956) (noting that despite one unusual case which allowed a 
servitude on jukeboxes, Pratte v. Balatsos, 113 A.2d 492 (N.H. 1955), between 1928 and 1956, only 
three of seven attempts to bind personal property were successful); Merrill & Smith, supra note 34, at 
18–19; Robinson, supra note 37, at 1455 (declaring that the author “ha[d] discovered only a few cases 
decided since 1956 involving attempts to create common law servitudes”). 
39.  Henry E. Smith, Institutions and Indirectness in Intellectual Property, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 
2083, 2122 (2009). 
40.  See Robinson, supra note 37, at 1453 (“To the extent [particular] restraints [on usage] are 
valid for real property, they should be valid, pari passu, for personal property.”). 
41.  See, e.g., Mulligan, supra note 38 (manuscript at 16) (“Even many unique items, such as 
gemstones and naturally-grown items, are difficult to distinguish among without learned expertise and 
detailed record keeping about defects and size, or the presence of unique identifiers like serial 
numbers.”); id. (manuscript at 18) (“Although it is conceivably possible to place unique identifiers on 
many chattels, identifiers can be removed, and some objects are too small to easily place a visible serial 
number on.”); Matt Corriel, Comment, Up for Grabs: A Workable System for the Unilateral Acquisition 
of Chattels, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 807, 839 (2013) (“Fungible chattels, or interchangeable chattels, make 
up the vast majority of objects in modern American life.”). 
42.  See Van Houweling, supra note 37, at 907 (“[I]t is relatively easy for an item of personal 
property to travel with its terms attached directly to it . . . . [T]he availability of this type of express 
notice might justify applying the logic of Tulk [v. Moxhay (1848) 41 Eng. Rep. 1143; 2 Ph. 774, which 
created equitable servitudes] to personal property, enforcing running restrictions upon a finding of 
actual notice.”). 
43.  Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and Verification: The Numerus 
Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S373, S417 (2002). 
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demand for chattels that are encumbered with restrictions.44 Further 
hypotheses include the ideas that servitudes would prevent quick and 
efficient transfers of personal property45 and that attaching any time limit or 
termination to the encumbrance would not only be impractical but virtually 
impossible.46 What is more, it has been argued that the most practical 
reason for rejecting encumbrances on property rights is the cost-prohibitive 
nature of investigating the nature and history of the restraints on a single 
piece of personal property.47 The so-called informational cost of what 
would be comparable to a land title search on a pocket watch purchased at 
a flea market is, by its very nature, too costly to justify the purchase.48 
Regardless of the practicality of encumbrances, courts generally tend to 
reject servitudes on chattel by finding them to be undue restraints of 
trade.49 
II. THE HISTORY OF SOFTWARE ALIENABILITY 
Despite a general refusal of courts to impose servitudes on personal 
chattels,50 there has always been a particular carveout allowing additional 
protections for owners of copyrighted, trademarked, and patented 
materials.51 Over the last thirty years, as technology has advanced and the 
line between intellectual and personal property has been blurred, judges 
have permitted downstream restrictions of goods that contain copyrighted 
components, focusing on those items as intellectual property rather than as 
chattels.52 Such restrictions have allowed manufacturers to limit use of their 
 
44.  Robinson, supra note 37, at 1486 (“But property law has neither the purpose nor the power to 
create a market for idiosyncratic property interests.”). 
45.  Chafee, supra note 35, at 985 (“Land . . . is transferred after an elaborate investigation of the 
title, whereas chattels are ordinarily sold with rapidity, [therefore] possible interferences with quick 
transfers are undesirable.”). 
46.  Id. (comparing the eventual lapse of land restrictions to chattels, to which there would be “no 
possibility of affixing a reasonable termination to the life of the restriction [on a chattel] coëxtensive 
with the realization of [its] purpose”). 
47.  See generally Merrill & Smith, supra note 34 (discussing the “numerus clausus principle”). 
48.  Id.; see also Mulligan, supra note 38 (manuscript at 13). 
49.  See, e.g., Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1363 (2013). 
50.  See Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Touching and Concerning Copyright: Real Property 
Reasoning in MDY Industries, Inc. v. Blizzard Entertainment, Inc., 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1063, 
1068 (2011) (“While courts have increasingly accommodated land servitudes, the conventional wisdom 
under Anglo-American law has long been that the types of servitudes that can be attached to land 
cannot be attached to chattels.”). 
51.  U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. 
52.  Lothar Determann & Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Don’t Judge a Sale by Its License: Software 
Transfers Under the First Sale Doctrine in the United States and the European Community, 36 U.S.F. 
L. REV. 1, 106 (2001). 
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products to specific time constraints,53 as well as prevent resale of certain 
goods.54 
Historically, the “first sale doctrine” has prohibited manufacturers and 
retailers from restricting the purchaser’s rights for use and resale of 
personal property in the downstream marketplace.55 The theory essentially 
stems from the idea that once a purchaser pays for the use of the property, 
thereby becoming its owner, it is within the new owner’s rights to do as he 
pleases with the property.56 If there is a market for a used or previously 
owned good, then he may sell it at the price a buyer is willing to pay. 
Likewise, if he wishes to give it away to others, his freedom to gift his 
personal property permits such an act. Prohibiting restrictions on 
subsequent uses greatly decreases information costs associated with 
transfers of property, whether intellectual or personal, because there is no 
burdensome title or restraint search for the purchaser to perform. In the 
context of patent law, the first sale doctrine, also known as the doctrine of 
exhaustion, remains a rule of the common law, and is therefore not found in 
any patent statute.57 In contrast, the first sale doctrine as it relates to 
copyright was initially articulated by the Supreme Court in Bobbs-Merrill 
v. Straus,58 but the doctrine was shortly thereafter codified in the 1909 
Copyright Act.59 While the doctrine still holds today in both patent and 
copyright, the courts have eroded the doctrine and begun to permit 
downstream control of goods, especially when the purchaser has notice of 
the restrictions.60 
In particular, courts have allowed copyrighted software to be subject to 
downstream restrictions on continuing use and transfer of the property, 
effectively eliminating the first sale doctrine for software licenses. In MAI 
 
53.  See generally Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761 (2013). 
54.  See David Kravets & Roberto Baldwin, Google Is Forbidding Users from Reselling, Loaning 
Glass Eyewear, WIRED MAG. (Apr. 17, 2013, 3:00 PM), http://www.wired.com/gadgetlab/2013/ 
04/google-glass-resales/. 
55.  For a discussion on the early restraints under the first sale doctrine, see Herbert Hovenkamp, 
Post-Sale Restraints and Competitive Harm: The First Sale Doctrine in Perspective, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. 
SURV. AM. L. 487, 495–503 (2011). 
56.  Chang & Smith, supra note 17, at 21–26. 
57.  See Hovenkamp, supra note 55, at 511; see also Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 453 
(1873). 
58.  Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908) (holding that books containing copyrighted 
works could not be subject to a requirement that they be resold at a particular price). 
59.  The Copyright Act of 1909 § 41 provided, “[N]othing in this Act shall be deemed to forbid, 
prevent, or restrict the transfer of any copy of a copyrighted work the possession of which has been 
lawfully obtained.” Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075, 1084 (1909). See also 17 U.S.C. § 109 (2012) 
(codifying the first sale doctrine for phonorecords). 
60.  See generally Kurtis A. Kemper, Annotation, Construction and Application of “First Sale 
Doctrine” in Copyright Law, 75 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 387 (2013). 
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Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer Inc.,61 the Ninth Circuit allowed 
restrictions on the use of software by focusing on the manner in which the 
software operates on a computer, attaching particular significance to the 
physical integration between the two.62 The court held that running a 
software program that automatically created a temporary copy of itself in a 
computer’s Random Access Memory (RAM) constituted prima facie 
copying of the software and thus was copyright infringement when done 
without permission.63 The Ninth Circuit distinguished 17 U.S.C. 
§ 117(a)(1),64 which allows “owners” of a copy of a computer program to 
copy the program for certain limited uses. The court held that this statute 
does not apply to licensees, as opposed to owners.65 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in MAI indicates that, based upon the way 
computers function, no one can ever use software without technically 
copying the program. Thus, use outside the scope of the software license 
infringes the software copyright.66 Courts applying MAI have held that 
when a copyrighted image is viewed on the World Wide Web without 
permission, the resulting copy created in the viewer’s computer’s RAM 
constitutes infringement.67 As a result, most software programs now 
 
61.  MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993). 
62.  Id. at 518–19. 
63.  Id. 
64.  The statute says, in pertinent part, that 
it is not an infringement for the owner of a copy of a computer program to make . . . another 
copy . . . of that computer program provided . . . that such a new copy . . . is created as an 
essential step in the utilization of the computer program in conjunction with a machine and 
that it is used in no other manner . . . . 
17 U.S.C. § 117(a)(1) (2006) (emphasis added). 
65.  MAI, 991 F.2d at 518–19. After the Ninth Circuit decision, Congress amended the statute to 
explicitly allow the temporary copying of programs in connection with computer repair and 
maintenance. But interestingly, Congress did not change the word “owner” in the statute. 17 U.S.C. 
§ 117(a)(1) (2012). 
66.  Academic criticism of the decision has been voluminous and sharp. See, e.g., Bradley J. 
Nicholson, Ghost in the Machine: MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc. and the Problem of 
Copying in RAM, 10 HIGH TECH. L.J. 147, 167 (1995) (“MAI achieves this unprecedented level of 
protection . . . . [by creating] a copyright violation out of merely reading and using information.”); 
Gretchen McCord Hoffmann, Note, Arguments for the Need for Statutory Solutions to the Copyright 
Problem Presented by RAM Copies Made During Web Browsing, 9 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 97, 104 
(2000) (“Some have argued that the decision is a valid interpretation of the Copyright Act, but that its 
results are ‘inequitable, impractical, and nonsensical’ . . . .” (citing Jule L. Sigall, Comment, Copyright 
Infringement Was Never This Easy: RAM Copies and Their Impact on the Scope of Copyright 
Protection for Computer Programs, 45 CATH. U. L. REV. 181, 182 (1995))); id. at n.19 (listing other 
articles criticizing the MAI decision); Pamela Samuelson, The NII Intellectual Property Report, 
COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM, Dec. 1994, at 21, 23 (claiming that a copy placed on a computer’s 
RAM is no more a fixed copy than the reflected image of a book in a mirror). 
67.  Intellectual Reserve, Inc. v. Utah Lighthouse Ministry, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1294 (D. 
Utah 1999) (citing MAI, 991 F.2d at 518). But see CoStar Grp, Inc. v. LoopNet Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 551 
(4th Cir. 2004) (holding that “copies” made from web pages to a computer’s RAM “would appear not 
to be ‘fixed’ in the sense that they are [not] ‘of more than transitory duration’”). 
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employ “terms of use” or “end-user license agreements” that allow the 
copying of the program into RAM for only specified uses.68 These end-user 
agreements have been routinely enforced even though they are notoriously 
cumbersome and go unread by the majority of users,69 including some 
judges.70 
As further evidence of the erosion of the end user’s rights and the 
extension of encumbrances on software programs, we need look no further 
than 17 U.S.C. § 106(3). Section 106(3) grants copyright holders the 
exclusive right “to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted 
work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, 
lease, or lending.”71 Although objects bearing copyrighted content are 
physically more akin to chattels—CDs are “things”—allowing the 
copyright owner to determine how he will transfer his copyrighted property 
seems to be more in line with the way we treat traditional encumbrances of 
real property. Some theorists have posited that § 106(3) should be read 
such that an authorized distribution of a copyrighted work, including 
software, either transfers ownership of the copy itself, or simply transfers 
temporary usage rights.72 Perzanowski and Schultz, for instance, argue that 
uninterrupted possession without continued, subscription-style payments 
should be classified as a sale, not a license.73 Yet, given MAI and its 
 
68.  See, e.g., Product Licenses and Terms of Use, ADOBE, http://www.adobe.com/legal/licenses-
terms.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2015) (providing the terms of use for all Adobe programs). 
69.  In a uniquely candid decision in 2002, a Massachusetts District Court judge led off his 
decision with the following statement, supporting the generalization that virtually nobody reads terms 
of service or software licenses: 
Has this happened to you? You plunk down a pretty penny for the latest and greatest 
software, speed back to your computer, tear open the box, shove the CD–ROM into the 
computer, click on “install” and, after scrolling past a license agreement which would take at 
least fifteen minutes to read, find yourself staring at the following dialog box: “I agree.” Do 
you click on the box? You probably do not agree in your heart of hearts, but you click 
anyway, not about to let some pesky legalese delay the moment for which you’ve been 
waiting. Is that “clickwrap” license agreement enforceable? Yes, at least in the case 
described below. 
i.Lan Sys., Inc. v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328, 329 (D. Mass. 2002). See also 
Daniel B. Ravicher, Facilitating Collaborative Software Development: The Enforceability of Mass-
Market Public Software Licenses, VA. J.L. & TECH., Fall 2000, at 2 (describing a typical software 
license as including user assent to “abide by all the terms and conditions of the following agreement 
(that everybody is expected to read but nobody ever does)”); Garry L. Founds, Note, Shrinkwrap and 
Clickwrap Agreements: 2B or Not 2B?, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 99, 100 (1999). 
70.  Chief Justice of the Supreme Court John G. Roberts, Jr. himself admitted that he does not 
read user agreements required to visit some websites. See Debra Cassens Weiss, Chief Justice Roberts 
Admits He Doesn’t Read the Computer Fine Print, ABA J. (Oct. 20, 2010, 12:17 PM), http://www. 
abajournal.com/news/article/chief_justice_roberts_admits_he_doesnt_read_the_computer_fine_print/. 
71.  17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2012). 
72.  Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, Reconciling Intellectual and Personal Property, 90 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1211, 1253–60 (2015). 
73.  See id. 
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progeny, it appears that courts are content to let software copyright holders 
decide whether their transfers of software programs to users are to be 
classified as sales or leases. 
More recently, the Ninth Circuit examined the use of the first sale 
doctrine in two similar cases involving copyrighted works, but with 
opposite results. First, UMG Recordings v. Augusto involved unapproved 
resale of promotional music CDs.74 The CDs in question had been sent to 
music critics and radio stations in an effort to promote new releases, a 
common practice in the industry.75 Each CD included an explicit notice 
indicating that the CD was to be used for promotional purposes only, and 
that the license was non-transferable.76 The defendant acquired the CDs 
without UMG’s permission and resold them on eBay.77 UMG sued, arguing 
that the CDs had been licensed, not sold, to the stations and individual 
critics, and therefore the defendant had neither personal rights to use the 
CDs nor any rights to transfer to others.78 The Ninth Circuit held that UMG 
failed to create a binding licensing agreement, despite the affixed notice, in 
part because the recipients had not explicitly agreed to the terms of the 
license.79 The court held that UMG, in mailing the discs, effectively 
transferred ownership in them, and therefore the discs were subject to the 
first sale doctrine, meaning that the recipients acquired title to them and 
could therefore dispose of them as they pleased.80 
On the day that UMG was decided, the same panel of judges came to 
the opposite conclusion in Vernor v. Autodesk.81 With facts similar to those 
in Augusto, the defendant resold software that had allegedly already been 
licensed to other users.82 The court applied the Ninth Circuit’s three-part 
first sale doctrine test to determine whether the software in question had 
been licensed or sold; specifically, it examined (1) “whether the copyright 
 
74.  UMG Recordings Inc. v. Augusto, 628 F.3d 1175, 1177 (9th Cir. 2011). 
75.  Id. 
76.  Several of the CDs bore the following label:  
This CD is the property of the record company and is licensed to the intended recipient for 
personal use only. Acceptance of this CD shall constitute an agreement to comply with the 
terms of the license. Resale or transfer of possession is not allowed and may be punishable 
under federal and state laws. 
Id. at 1177–78. Others in the lot that the defendant sold contained a shorter warning, “Promotional Use 
Only—Not for Sale.” Id. at 1178. 
77.  Id. at 1178. 
78.  Id. at 1179. 
79.  Id. at 1180. 
80.  Id. at 1179 (“Notwithstanding its distinctive name, the [first sale] doctrine applies not only 
when a copy is first sold, but when a copy is given away or title is otherwise transferred without the 
accouterments of a sale.”). 
81.  Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010). 
82.  Id. at 1105. 
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owner specifies that a user is granted a license”; (2) “whether the copyright 
owner significantly restricts the user’s ability to transfer the software”; and 
(3) “whether the copyright owner imposes notable use restrictions” on the 
work.83 The court held that, unlike in UMG, the plaintiff in Vernor had 
established that the specific licenses were consented to by the defendant, 
and thus restricted the defendant from reselling the software.84 In addition, 
the court stated in these cases that software licensing is entitled to unique 
treatment that other types of personal property are not. The court in Vernor 
explicitly applied a test that is specific to software licensing,85 and in UMG, 
the court noted that “[p]articularly with regard to computer software, we 
have recognized that copyright owners may create licensing 
arrangements.”86 The fact that there was no explicit consent to the license 
in UMG, but there was in Vernor, indicates that the first sale doctrine 
requires both parties to consent to the limitations on the end-user’s rights 
for the encumbrances to be valid.87 Acceptance of encumbrances to one’s 
property rights through silence, however, does not appear to be enough. 
Most recently, in Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc.,88 the U.S. 
District Court for the Southern District of New York held that the first sale 
doctrine was applicable only to the physical copies of copyrighted musical 
works,89 further advancing the judicial trend of affording special treatment 
to digital property. The court stated: 
[T]he first sale defense is limited to material items, like records, 
that the copyright owner put into the stream of commerce. Here, 
[defendant] is not distributing such material items; rather, it is 
distributing reproductions of the copyrighted code embedded in 
new material objects . . . . The first sale defense does not cover this 
any more than it covered the sale of cassette recordings of vinyl 
records in a bygone era.90 
The court went on to state that 
 
83.  Id. at 1107–11. 
84.  Id. at 1111–12. 
85.  Id. at 1107–09. 
86.  UMG Recordings Inc. v. Augusto, 628 F.3d 1175, 1180 (9th Cir. 2011) (emphasis added). 
87.  Id. (“Our conclusion that the recipients acquired ownership of the CDs is based largely on the 
nature of UMG’s distribution.”). See also ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996); 
Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 150 F. Supp. 2d 585 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d, 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 
2002). 
88.  Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
89.  Id. at 648–51. 
90.  Id. at 655. 
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Section 109(a) [of the Copyright Act] still protects a lawful 
owner’s sale of her “particular” phonorecord, be it a computer hard 
disk, iPod, or other memory device onto which the file was 
originally downloaded. While this limitation clearly presents 
obstacles to resale that are different from, and perhaps even more 
onerous than, those involved in the resale of CDs and cassettes, the 
limitation is hardly absurd . . . .91 
In declining to apply the first sale doctrine, the court said that “here, 
the Court cannot of its own accord condone the wholesale application of 
the first sale defense to the digital sphere, particularly when Congress itself 
has declined to take that step.”92 This is another example of a court 
allowing encumbrances on digital property, making the legal treatment of 
digital property in some ways more similar to real property than to chattel 
property. 
Courts have also restricted applications of the first sale doctrine in the 
area of patent law, where it remains a common law rule referred to as 
“patent exhaustion.”93 Much like the first sale doctrine, under the patent 
exhaustion doctrine, selling a patented good in and of itself generally 
terminates the patent owner’s rights to control the future fate of that 
particular item.94 The patent holder, while owning the right to prevent 
infringement and unauthorized reproduction of a patented good, usually 
may not impose servitudes on the particular good itself.95 In Mallinckrodt 
v. MediPart Inc., however, the Federal Circuit allowed a manufacturer to 
impose certain usage restrictions on its patented goods, holding that 
because a patent holder had a right to deny all rights to a purchaser, it was 
therefore entitled to grant or deny any combination of rights it wished, 
including whole or partial rights.96 The court also held that while the 
doctrine of exhaustion might eventually eliminate the patent holder’s rights 
downstream, the patent holder was entitled to prevent reuse and subsequent 
 
91.  Id. at 656. 
92.  Id. at 660. 
93.  Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elec., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 625 (2008) (“The longstanding 
doctrine of patent exhaustion provides that the initial authorized sale of a patented item terminates all 
patent rights to that item.”). 
94.  Id. at 626 (noting that under the patent exhaustion doctrine “the right to vend is exhausted by 
a single, unconditional sale, the article sold being thereby carried outside the monopoly of the patent 
law and rendered free of every restriction which the vendor may attempt to put upon it.” (quoting 
Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 516 (1917))). 
95.  See id. 
96.  See Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. MediPart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 703 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“The 
enforceability of restrictions on the use of patented goods derives from the patent grant, which is in 
classical terms of property: the right to exclude. . . . This right to exclude may be waived in whole or in 
part.”). 
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licenses of a patented device by labeling it for a single use only.97 The 
Federal Circuit went even further in B. Braun Medical, Inc. v. Abbott 
Laboratories, permitting restrictions on patented goods if the purchaser 
received notice of the restrictions, those restrictions were within the scope 
of the patent, and the patent rights had not yet been exhausted.98 The end 
result has permitted patent holders to place restrictions on chattels that 
would not typically be allowed if there were no intellectual property 
components attached.99 
III. TWO CHEERS FOR SOFTWARE PRICE DISCRIMINATION 
In this Part, we discuss the use of price discrimination in the 
distribution of software and how changes in technology are facilitating 
more perfect price discrimination. We show that there are downsides to 
price discrimination for those who can pay more, and sometimes for the 
entire economy. But we give software price discrimination two cheers 
overall because a special characteristic of software means that as price 
discrimination comes closer to perfect, it will lead to greater distribution of 
software to more people and will increase total welfare. Because the 
marginal cost of distributing an additional copy of software is near zero, 
facilitating increasing price discrimination will allow the provision of 
software to greater numbers of individuals who were formerly priced out of 
the market. This will increase total market welfare and also 
disproportionately help the poor. 
A. Price Discrimination 
We explain price discrimination only briefly in this Section, given that 
there is a large and well-defined body of literature on price discrimination 
 
97.  Id. at 708–09. 
98.  B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1426 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (holding that 
patent exhaustion “does not apply to an expressly conditional sale or license”); see also Mallinckrodt, 
976 F.2d at 709. 
99.  But see Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elec., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 625 (2008) (holding that 
when a patent holder licensed a component manufacturer to manufacture and sell components 
“substantially embodying” the patents at issue, the patent exhaustion doctrine prevented the patent 
holder from asserting patent infringement against the buyer of the components who then used the 
components in a way that fulfilled the elements of the patent claims). See generally Sarah Rajec, 
Evaluating Flexibility in International Patent Law, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 153 (2013); Editorial Board, 
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in both economics and law.100 The basics of price discrimination are well 
known and undisputed.101 At its most fundamental level, price 
discrimination consists of charging different buyers different prices for the 
same product when the variance in price does not reflect variance in cost to 
the seller.102 Examples of price discrimination generally involve sellers 
who have market power and thus can sell their products at prices above the 
price that would be charged in a state of perfect competition.103 Sellers who 
do not have market power cannot engage in consumer-welfare-decreasing 
price discrimination because they cannot sell above market price.104 
Sellers engage in price discrimination in an attempt to increase their 
profitability by varying their prices according to buyers’ willingness to 
pay.105 Economists divide price discrimination into three degrees. First-
degree price discrimination takes place when a seller knows the exact price 
that each consumer is willing to pay and charges each consumer that 
price.106 This is also called perfect price discrimination and is generally 
thought to be impossible to achieve.107 Accordingly, in second- and third-
 
100.  See, e.g., THE ECONOMICS OF PRICE DISCRIMINATION (George Norman ed., 1999); LOUIS 
PHLIPS, THE ECONOMICS OF PRICE DISCRIMINATION (1983); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF LAW (7th ed. 2007); John P. Conley & Christopher S. Yoo, Nonrivalry and Price 
Discrimination in Copyright Economics, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1801, 1814–16, 1820 (2009); William W. 
Fisher III, When Should We Permit Differential Pricing of Information?, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1 (2007); 
Hovenkamp, supra note 55, at 532–38; Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A 
Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. REV 1813, 1873–82 (1984); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Copyright’s Price 
Discrimination Panacea, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 387 (2008); Michael J. Meurer, Copyright Law and 
Price Discrimination, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 55 (2001) [hereinafter Meurer, Copyright Law]; Michael J. 
Meurer, Price Discrimination, Personal Use and Piracy: Copyright Protection of Digital Works, 45 
BUFF. L. REV. 845, 869–74 (1997) [hereinafter Meurer, Personal Use]; Christina Mulligan, A Numerus 
Clausus Principle for Intellectual Property, 80 TENN. L. REV. 235, 285–89 (2013); Guy A. Rub, 
Rebalancing Copyright Exhaustion, 64 EMORY L.J. 741, 771 (2015). 
101.  See THE ECONOMICS OF PRICE DISCRIMINATION, supra note 100; PHLIPS, supra note 100; 
POSNER, supra note 100, at 291. 
102.  Fisher, supra note 100, at 21–22; Hovenkamp, supra note 55, at 532; Meurer, Copyright 
Law, supra note 100, at 67–68; Meurer, Personal Use, supra note 100, at 869. 
103.  Conley & Yoo, supra note 100, at 1816 (“[I]n the best of all possible worlds, where 
identification is feasible, price discrimination would result in the highest possible social welfare.”); 
Meurer, Personal Use, supra note 100, at 870 (using the case of ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 
1447, 1450 (7th Cir. 1996), as a running example, and also citing to JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF 
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 133–52 (1988) for the general prospect that successful price discrimination 
models depend upon market power); Mulligan, supra note 100, at 286–89 (utilizing Microsoft software 
products as examples). 
104.  See N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS 314–17 (6th ed. 2012).  
105.  POSNER, supra note 100, at 291; Fisher, supra note 100, at 27; Meurer, Copyright Law, 
supra note 100, at 139. 
106.  See R. GLENN HUBBARD & ANTHONY PATRICK O’BRIEN, MICROECONOMICS, 515–16 (2nd 
ed. 2008); Price Discrimination, ECONOMICS ONLINE, http://www.economicsonline.co.uk/Business_ 
economics/Price_discrimination.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2015). 
107.  See HUBBARD & O’BRIEN, supra note 106, at 515–16; Price Discrimination, supra note 
106. 
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degree price discrimination, sellers divide buyers into separate groups and 
sell at different prices to each group.108 
Second-degree price discrimination occurs when a seller cannot 
determine consumers’ reservation prices and therefore alters characteristics 
and prices of the good being sold in the hope that this will roughly sort 
consumers by willingness to pay. Examples of this include discounting 
movie ticket prices during the weekday,109 offering special prices at 
restaurants during non-peak hours,110 and offering only higher-priced 
hardcover editions of a new book for a period of time before selling less 
expensive paperback editions.111 In these examples, the seller of each item 
assumes that the differing characteristics of the item being offered 
correspond to different consumer reservation prices, and the seller sets 
prices accordingly. Thus, in the examples just mentioned, sellers assume 
that the consumers who want to buy evening movie tickets or eat at peak 
hours (most working adults), or those who purchase hardcover books (those 
most eager to read new books), will be willing to pay more than more 
price-sensitive consumers.112 
Third-degree price discrimination takes place when a seller divides 
consumers into different pricing groups based on characteristics of the 
consumers rather than of the good. A simple example is giving student or 
senior citizen discounts while charging non-student adults more based on 
the assumption that students and the elderly generally have smaller 
 
108.  See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 100, at 291 (“Usually the best the discriminating monopolist 
can do is divide his customers into a few groups and set a single (although different) price for each 
group.”); Fisher, supra note 100, at 12 (explaining how third-degree price discrimination does not tend 
to upset people and that “[n]o one protests, for example, when students or senior citizens are admitted to 
museums for less money than other visitors. And the practice . . . of providing heavy discounts to 
academic consumers of software is not controversial.”). 
109.  Rachel Zarrell, Big Screen, Small Bucks, BOSTON.COM (2009), http://www.boston.com/ae/ 
movies/packages/spendingsmartmovies/ (compiling senior discounts at Boston-area movie theaters). 
110.  Viviane Eng, OffPeak Aims to Be Resource for On-Campus Food, DAILY TROJAN (Oct. 14, 
2014), http://dailytrojan.com/2014/10/14/offpeak-aims-to-be-resource-for-on-campus-food/ (discussing 
a new app that began on campus but now helps students find discounted eating-out opportunities off 
campus). Some waitstaff go further and actually conduct online searches on individual customers in 
advance of visits. See Jessica Sidman, How D.C. Servers Are Secretly Profiling Diners, WASH. CITY 
PAPER (July 15, 2015, 9:03 PM) http://www.washingtoncitypaper.com/blogs/youngandhungry/ 
2015/07/15/how-d-c-servers-are-secretly-profiling-diners/. Criticizing some more intrusive forms of 
price discrimination in restaurants, one author described how “[h]igh-end restaurants are starting to 
Google their customers, to better personalize their dining experiences. They can’t give people menus 
with different prices, but they can certainly hand them the wine list with either the cheaper side up or 
the more expensive side up.” SCHNEIER, supra note 4, at 112. 
111.  See C.C., Why Books Come out in Hardback Before Paperback, ECONOMIST (Oct. 15, 2014, 
11:50 PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2014/10/economist-explains-15. 
112.  Similarly, some consumers are willing to pay more for higher music file quality than others. 
James Cook, Tech Companies Want You to Buy Your Music All Over Again at Higher Prices, BUSINESS 
INSIDER (Jan. 13, 2015, 9:46 AM), http://uk.businessinsider.com/high-resolution-music-prices-2015-1. 
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discretionary funds and therefore are unwilling to pay as much as others for 
products and services.113 
On the high end of price discrimination, sellers use branding, luxury 
status, exclusivity, small aesthetic changes, and geographic pricing 
schemes, among other things, to price discriminate to get more money from 
buyers who either value the product more highly or are simply willing to 
pay more because they are richer.114 Sellers engaged in this form of second-
degree price discrimination charge higher prices to buyers who are willing 
to pay more for something that is perceived as exclusive or luxurious.115 An 
example of this occurred when Apple at one point offered otherwise 
identical MacBook computers for a $150 price difference based on whether 
the computer was housed in a white case or a black one.116 This color 
 
113.  For data on the relative lower expenditures of youth and the elderly, see BUREAU OF LABOR 
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, Consumer Expenditure Survey, Table 1300 Age of Reference 
Person: Shares of Annual Aggregate Expenditures and Sources of Income (2013), 
http://www.bls.gov/cex/2013/aggregate/age.pdf. To be sure, some students and elderly persons are quite 
rich and may have very high reservation prices, so this sort of price discrimination is far from perfect. 
But as a method of roughly dividing people into groups based on willingness to pay, it works well 
enough to make it worthwhile. See, e.g., SENIORDISCOUNTS.COM, http://www.seniordiscounts.com (last 
visited Sept. 28, 2015) (claiming to offer over 250,000 discount opportunities for citizens over fifty 
years old); STUDENT ADVANTAGE, LLC, http://www.studentadvantage.com/content/?id=762 (last 
visited Sept. 28, 2015) (claiming to offer thousands of student discounts). Psychology research suggests 
that price discrimination is more palatable to consumers when it is based on some types of special 
status, such as being a senior citizen or a particularly loyal customer. See Lan Xia & Kent B. Monroe, Is 
A Good Deal Always Fair? Examining the Concepts of Transaction Value and Price Fairness, 31 J. 
ECON. PSYCHOL. 884, 893 (2010). See also Julia Angwin et al., The Tiger Mom Tax: Asians Nearly 
Twice as Likely to Get Higher Price from Princeton Review, HUFFINGTON POST, Sept. 1, 2015, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/the-tiger-mom-tax-asians-nearly-twice-as-likely-to-get-higher-
price-from-princeton-review_55e5ddd8e4b0b7a9633a5fde; David Goldman, Amazon Says New Prime 
Program Will Make More Free-Shipping Items Available, CNNMONEY, Sept. 1, 2015, 
http://money.cnn.com/2015/09/01/technology/amazon-prime-ship-by-region/index.html?iid=ob_ 
homepage_tech_pool&iid=obnetwork.  
114.  See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 100, at 3–4 (citing airline frequent flyer programs and 
university pricing differentials); Meurer, Copyright Law, supra note 100, at 67–68 (using differential 
pricing in movie theaters, including geographic discrimination, as example); Meurer, Personal Use, 
supra note 100, at 869 (“In the ideal case of perfect price discrimination, every customer is charged her 
maximum willingness to pay for the items she purchases.”). See generally Asher Wolinsky, Brand 
Names and Price Discrimination, 35 J. INDUS. ECON. 255 (1987) (arguing that marketing branded and 
off-label products by the same company is a form of price discrimination). 
115.  Fisher, supra note 100, at 9 (“Even in the fashion industry, one finds price discrimination 
[wherein] major fashion houses often produce clothes in two (or more) forms—a premium line 
(Armani), and a cheaper, ‘bridge’ line (Emporio Armani). . . . [T]he substantial price difference 
between the two versions cannot be explained by differences in manufacturing costs. Rather, it enables 
the manufacturer to charge a great deal for the premium items without forfeiting less wealthy or eager 
customers.”); Wolinsky, supra note 114, at 256 (“[B]uyers who strongly prefer a particular brand may 
be willing to pay a higher price for a labeled brand, while others may rather buy a cheaper unlabeled 
brand whose identity is uncertain.”). 
116.  Robert H. Frank, How Much Is that Laptop? It Depends on the Color of the Case. And 
That’s Fair., N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/06/business/06 
scene.html?_r=0. 
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difference in the computer case allowed the manufacturer to charge a larger 
amount of money to those who wanted a more exclusive product, or who 
just really liked black computers. 
Price discrimination decreases the consumer welfare of those buyers 
who pay more under a price discrimination scheme than they would if the 
product were offered for a single price.117 But price discrimination can also 
facilitate lower pricing for some consumers, which enhances those 
consumers’ welfare.118 Price discrimination can also increase total market 
welfare if allocative efficiency is increased.119 For example, price 
discrimination can enable a manufacturer to make up the costs of 
production in a way that allows it to charge relatively poorer people less 
and still make a profit from charging relatively richer people more. Thus, in 
some circumstances, price discrimination facilitates the subsidization of 
poorer users by richer ones.120 
It is not always the low-value consumer who is poor, nor the high-
value consumer who is rich.121 It depends on the market and goods being 
sold. For instance, wealthy people generally value check-cashing services 
very little while poor people without banking accounts value such services 
much more.122 Accordingly, we could expect that if a check-cashing service 
provider were to discriminate between the two groups, it would charge the 
poor people more and the rich less. This is exactly what we see happen. 
Poorer people generally pay substantially more to have their checks cashed 
 
117.  See Hovenkamp, supra note 55, at 532; see also Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Perfect 
Curve, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1799, 1806–07 (2000) (citing Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The 
New Economic Orthodoxy of “Rights Management”, 97 MICH. L. REV. 462, 498–99, 542–51 (1998) 
(discussing difference between private and social welfare, both generally and in the particular context of 
information markets)). 
118.  Fisher, supra note 100, at 25 (arguing that price discrimination generally results in 
“redistribution of wealth ‘downward’ [that] will increase social welfare”). 
119.  See id. at 22; Meurer, Personal Use, supra note 100, at 845 n.263. “Allocative efficiency” 
refers to goods and services being allocated to their highest uses, or in other words, resources being 
allocated efficiently to where they are most valuable in the economy. Harold Demsetz, The Private 
Production of Public Goods, 13 J.L. & ECON. 293, 299 (1970). 
120.  See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 100, at 9 (arguing that price discrimination in the sale of drugs 
helps the poor). See also Taos Turner, There Are Ways TV-Loving Expats Can Get Around the Dreaded 
‘Geo-Block’, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 14, 2015, 12:01 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/expat/2015/04/14/firms-
circumvent-geo-blocking-helping-expats-watch-favorite-shows-abroad/ (discussing how some 
individuals try to circumvent geo-blocking, whose purpose can stem from a seller’s desire to engage in 
price discrimination). 
121.  In economics, the terms “high-value” and “low-value” consumers refer not to the value of 
the consumer, but to how much the consumer subjectively values the good or service at issue. See J. 
Shahar Dillbary, Predatory Bundling and the Exclusionary Standard, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1231, 
1237 (2010). 
122.  See, e.g., Michael S. Barr, Banking the Poor, 21 YALE J. ON REG. 121, 142–44 (2004) 
(explaining the mechanics of the check-cashing industry and identifying its customers as generally low 
income). 
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than do wealthy people.123 Credit card fees are another example where 
richer people generally pay less and poorer people pay more.124 Here again, 
poor people often have less access to credit and therefore are willing to pay 
more for it, while richer people have more options and therefore benefit 
from competition among companies that want their business.125 
Price discrimination can increase total market welfare in some cases, 
especially in comparison to monopoly pricing; it also can decrease total 
market welfare if the pricing is done in such a way as to decrease allocative 
efficiency.126 There is some dispute as to how often price discrimination as 
conducted in the real world is helpful or harmful to total market welfare.127 
Generally, however, price discrimination that is successful in significantly 
increasing a seller’s profitability will also increase allocative efficiency 
compared to pricing at a single monopoly price because—in addition to 
entailing charging more to those who are willing to pay more—successful 
price discrimination generally involves discounting the product to buyers 
who are not willing to pay the monopoly price.128 Indeed, many of the 
classic examples of price discrimination involve discounting prices for 
certain groups, rather than simply increasing prices. Air travel is an 
example. Airlines charge lower prices for Saturday stays in an attempt to 
separate leisure travelers from business travelers, the latter of whom 
generally want to be home for the weekend. The airlines thus charge more 
to business travelers in economy class, and even more for business and first 
class tickets, but they charge significantly less to leisure travelers.129 If 
 
123.  Id. at 146–48 (discussing the costs of check cashing for the poor). 
124.  See generally Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1373 (2004). 
125.  See id. 
126.  See Michael E. Levine, Price Discrimination Without Market Power, 19 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 
23 (2002). As Judge Richard Posner explained: 
Suppose the profit-maximizing single monopoly price [of a product] is $10, but rather than 
charging that price, the monopolist classifies buyers into two groups and charges $5 to 
members of one and $20 to members of the other. He gains sales—to those in the first group 
who will not pay $10 but are willing to pay $5. But he also loses sales—to those in the 
second group who are willing to pay $10 but refuse to pay $20. The lost sales may 
outnumber the sales gained. His output may be lower although his profits will be higher. 
 POSNER, supra note 100, at 291. 
127.  See generally Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single 
Monopoly Profit Theory, 123 HARV. L. REV. 397 (2009); Erik Hovenkamp & Herbert Hovenkamp, 
Tying Arrangements and Antitrust Harm, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 925 (2010); David S. Olson, First 
Amendment Based Copyright Misuse, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 537 (2010). 
128.  See generally Demsetz, supra note 119 (making the general normative point that price 
discrimination typically increases profit and allocative efficiency). But see Meurer, Copyright Law, 
supra note 100, at 99 nn.182–83 (giving theoretical examples of how a seller could increase profits 
using price discrimination while decreasing total welfare). 
129.  For a discussion of the economics of plane ticket pricing, see Sherwin Rosen & Andrew M. 
Rosenfield, Ticket Pricing, 40 J.L. & ECON. 351 (1997). 
3 MANTA AND OLSON 135-187 (DO NOT DELETE) 11/5/2015  8:50 AM 
158 Alabama Law Review [Vol. 67:1:135 
airlines were forced to charge a single price to all travelers, leisure travelers 
would probably have to pay more and travel less.130 
 
130.  Airline ticket pricing is actually very complex. Ticket prices change regularly and 
seemingly randomly. Many of these pricing methods are aimed at achieving additional price 
discrimination. For example, increasing prices within two weeks of a flight allows the airline to charge 
more to someone who appears to need to travel on a certain date, and is thus likely to be willing to pay 
more. Discounting prices for tickets purchased far in advance allows leisure travelers with flexible 
schedules to pay less. Thus, the airlines can sell to purchasers who might not otherwise fly at higher 
price points. Likewise, charging different prices based on routes and connections sometimes has to do 
with costs, and sometimes has to do with price discrimination based on what other options travelers 
have. There are many more ways in which airline pricing is tremendously complex, of course, but it is 
enough to say that price discrimination occurs in the industry to the detriment of some consumers and 
the benefit of others. See generally id. For critical discussions of price discrimination in the travel 
context, see John Hutchinson, Are You REALLY Getting the Best Deal? Research Reveals Online 
Customers Are Victims of ‘Price Discrimination’ When Booking Their Holidays, DAILYMAIL.COM 
(Oct. 29, 2014, 8:08 PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/travel/travel_news/article-2810744/Are-
REALLY-getting-best-deal-Research-reveals-online-customers-victims-price-discrimination-booking-
holidays.html; Tim Winship, Lawmakers to Airlines: ‘Enough Already!’, FREQUENTFLIER.COM (June 
16, 2015), http://www.frequentflier.com/blog/lawmakers-to-airlines-enough-already/ (quoting New 
York Senator Chuck Schumer as stating on the subject of a proposed new luggage size standard: 
“Enough already. The airlines already charge more for checked baggage, pillows, peanuts and head 
phones. It’s got to stop somewhere.”); Tim Wu, Why Airlines Want to Make You Suffer, THE NEW 
YORKER (Dec. 26, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/airlines-want-you-to-suffer; 
see also Patrick Gillespie, Judge Throws out United Airlines Lawsuit Against 22-Year-Old, 
CNNMONEY (May 1, 2015, 1:04 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/05/01/investing/united-airlines-
lawsuit-skiplagged/index.html (discussing the dismissal of a lawsuit against the website 
Skiplagged.com, which seeks to provide customers with cheaper airline tickets through searches of 
“hidden city” fares). Meanwhile, European airline Ryanair hopes to offer in a few years transatlantic 
flights that would start at $15 plus taxes. See Virginia Harrison, Low-Cost Airline Plans $15 Flight to 
Europe, CNNMONEY (Mar. 17, 2015, 11:46 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/03/17/news/companies/ 
ryanair-transatlantic-flights/index.html. See also Kathryn Vasel, Want a Seat Assignment on Delta? It 
Could Cost You, CNNMoney, Aug. 19, 2015, http://money.cnn.com/2015/08/19/pf/delta-basic-
economy-tickets/index.html?sr=cnnmoneybin082215delta0930story (discussing bare-bones pricing for 
airline tickets). One reason that some airlines can offer low base fares is that they make money from 
having customers customize other elements of travel, such as whether their flights will include certain 
types of food or WiFi service. See, e.g., Kerry Sheridan, Airlines Struggle to Please the Modern 
Passenger, YAHOO! NEWS (June 10, 2015, 5:25 AM), http://news.yahoo.com/ airlines-struggle-please-
modern-passenger-092523494.html. In rare cases, specific events raise or lower airline ticket prices, 
such as when fares between New York City and Washington, D.C. increased after an Amtrak accident 
hampered train travel for several days. See Bill Hutchinson, Airfares Between New York City, 
Washington Soar in Wake of Amtrak Crash, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (May 15, 2015), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/nyc-washington-airfares-soar-wake-deadly-amtrak-crash-
article-1.2223221. While these instances generally exemplify legal behavior, the Department of Justice 
is currently investigating several major airlines for the possibility that they collectively engaged in 
unlawful price fixing. See Evan Perez, DOJ Subpoenas Airlines over Keeping Ticket Prices High, CNN, 
July 2, 2015, http://www.cnn.com/2015/07/01/politics/doj-subpoenas-airlines-unlawful-
coordination/index.html?iid=EL. Last, some airlines specifically opt not to engage in price 
discrimination as a way to differentiate themselves in the market. See Hugo Martin, Southwest Airlines 
Will Keep Its ‘Bags Fly Free’ Policy, L.A. TIMES, July 28, 2015, http://www.latimes.com/business/la-
fi-southwest-airlines-free-checked-bags-20150728-story.html. For a discussion of how similar 
principles are applied in the hotel industry, see Tim Winship, Coming Soon to a Hotel Near You: 
Nuisance Fees, FREQUENTFLYER.COM, Aug. 31, 2015, http://www.frequentflier.com/blog/coming-
soon-to-a-hotel-near-you-nuisance-fees/; Tim Winship, These Hotels Charge Extra for Air 
Conditioning, FREQUENTFLYER.COM, Sept. 8, 2015, http://www.frequentflier.com/blog/these-hotels-
charge-extra-for-air-conditioning/. 
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Perfect price discrimination results in increased total market welfare as 
compared to selling at a single supra-competitive price,131 or even at 
several supra-competitive price points.132 In fact, perfect competition is no 
more efficient in terms of total market welfare than is perfect price 
discrimination.133 It is true that perfect price discrimination transfers all 
surplus from consumers to producers, but every consumer still gets the 
good she desires at her reservation price, and thus allocative efficiency is 
just as good under perfect price discrimination as it is under perfect 
competition.134 
Price discrimination that is utilized in a fairly competitive market runs 
a greater risk of decreasing both consumer welfare and total welfare.135 
This is because if prices start near the competitive price, and sellers find 
ways to charge some consumers more, consumer welfare and allocative 
efficiency are decreased. In such a case, the decrease in welfare cannot be 
counterbalanced by selling to others at prices below the prevailing price 
because in competitive markets, the prevailing price is at or near the 
seller’s cost. Price discrimination in a competitive market is difficult to 
achieve, however, because it generally requires illegal collusion amongst 
sellers.136 
There is an exception, however, by which price discrimination that is 
utilized in a fairly competitive market can increase both net consumer 
welfare and total welfare. This can occur for a special class of products for 
which the marginal cost of selling extra units is below the market price.137 
Even in mostly competitive markets, for goods with marginal costs of 
distribution that approach zero, price discrimination can facilitate sales that 
would not happen even in a competitive market. This is because the 
additional sales can be made below the price that equates to average total 
cost, or the like, which would need to be charged to make up costs if a 
 
131.  A supra-competitive price is a price above the competitive price. See David Gilo, Retail 
Competition Percolating Through to Suppliers and the Use of Vertical Integration, Tying, and Vertical 
Restraints to Stop It, 20 YALE J. ON REG. 25, 27 (2003). 
132.  Meurer, Copyright Law, supra note 100, at 68–69. 
133.  Perfect price discrimination ensures that all consumers who value a good above cost receive 
the good, just as perfect competition does. HUBBARD & O’BRIEN, supra note 106, at 516–17. Both are 
more theoretical than realistic descriptions of markets. 
134.  Id. 
135.  Mark Armstrong & John Vickers, Competitive Price Discrimination, 32 RAND J. OF ECON, 
579, 582, 600 (2001). 
136.  See MANKIW, supra note 104, at 314. While upward price discrimination in a competitive 
market reduces consumer and total welfare, price discrimination generally cannot be accomplished in 
competitive markets without collusion because other sellers have incentives to underbid above cost 
pricing by competitors. Id. Buyer arbitrage may also undermine such price discrimination, as discussed 
infra in note 141 and the accompanying text. 
137.  See Armstrong & Vickers, supra note 135, at 15–16. 
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producer could sell at only a single price. If it can price discriminate, the 
producer can sell the vast majority of its goods at or above average total 
cost, but can then profitably sell additional goods even significantly below 
average total cost, which means that consumers who would normally never 
have the chance to buy the good will be offered the good at a very low 
price. In this case, total welfare under price discrimination is greater than in 
a normally competitive market without price discrimination. 
An example of such price discrimination can be found in Boston, 
where some bus companies sell a few seats for very low prices, certainly 
under average total cost. For instance, the Bolt Bus offers a specific 
number of seats from Boston to New York City for only $1.138 Part of this 
discount can be counted as part of the cost of promoting the service, 
because the company can advertise rates as low as $1. But this is also a 
form of price discrimination resulting in consumers getting a service well 
below market price. And so long as the buses tend not to be full when they 
drive to New York City, this makes economic sense for the bus company. 
In general, the company must sell its seats at a price to cover its costs of 
fuel, driver, equipment, and overhead. But the marginal cost of selling the 
last few unsold seats on a bus bound for New York City is close to zero for 
the bus company. There will be a slight increase in fuel consumption to 
carry the weight of the extra passengers and luggage, and there is a small 
transaction cost arising from printing and selling the ticket, but otherwise, it 
is basically costless for the bus company to sell the seat. Thus, the bus 
company can be a bit more profitable even by selling some tickets 
significantly below market price.139 As we will discuss below, software 
distribution meets this condition of having a very low marginal cost of 
making extra copies available.140 
 
138.  See FAQ, BOLTBUS, https://www.boltbus.com/faq.aspx (last visited Sept. 28, 2015) (citing 
the $1 fare). 
139.  The market price in a competitive industry should roughly reflect average total cost over the 
long run. See HUBBARD & O’BRIEN, supra note 106, at 419 tbl. 12-2. Thus, sales below market prices 
generally are also sales below average total cost. In these cases, the marginal cost of offering the unsold 
seats is much lower than average total cost, so selling at or near marginal cost is profitable for the 
business. Id. The bus company can only offer a few tickets at this low fare, however. If the bus 
company offered numerous tickets at the very low fare, then customers would be wise to attempt to buy 
tickets on a number of buses until they got the ultra low price. This would hurt normal sales. In 
addition, if the company offered too many tickets at the low price, consumers might be unwilling to pay 
for regular priced tickets, feeling that those tickets are “too expensive,” which would mean that the 
company could not cover its costs. As it is, on the rare occasions when bus customers are able to get a 
$1 ticket, they may view it more as winning a prize, rather than thinking that the regular ticket prices 
are excessive. This builds goodwill with the bus company’s customers, and allows the company to eke 
out a little more profit. 
140.  See infra Part III.C. 
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Price discrimination is often quite difficult to achieve even in a 
monopoly market, however, because arbitrage can easily occur.141 A seller 
that wants to price discriminate in the sales of its product must do more 
than simply sort consumers into separate groups of those who value a 
product at a higher price and those who value it at a lower price. This is the 
easy part of price discrimination. The hard part is selling to each group and 
not having the low-priced sales destroy the market for the high-priced 
offerings. If the producer offers different prices to different groups, then 
some purchasers who are offered low prices will figure out that they can 
buy extra products and resell them at a medium price to those consumers to 
whom the seller is offering only a high price. This buying low and reselling 
high is classic arbitrage and is socially wasteful.142 Price discrimination can 
only be successful if arbitrage can be mostly thwarted.143 Producers utilize 
second- and third-degree price discrimination as means of preventing 
arbitrage. 144 
B. The Evolution of Software From Product to Ongoing Service 
Prior to the growth of Internet computing, particularly in the home, 
computer programs and video games (collectively “software”) were 
purchased by the user and installed on only one unit at a time.145 Typically, 
the average household had only one computer or gaming system (if it had 
either), and the software purchased was only used on that single unit. 
Although multiple people accessed a single computer, there were not 
“users” with individual profiles the way there are today. Early computers 
had a single operating system (usually DOS-based) and could only run a 
 
141.  See John Shepard Wiley Jr. et al., The Leasing Monopolist, 37 UCLA L. REV. 693, 728 
(1990). In a monopolistic or competitive market, price discrimination is also difficult due to competitive 
price pressure. See MANKIW, supra note 104, at 314. 
142.  See Daniel A. Farber & Brett H. McDonnell, Why (and How) Fairness Matters at the 
IP/Antitrust Interface, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1817, 1867 (2003). 
143.  See HUBBARD & O’BRIEN, supra note 106, at 508. 
144.  For instance, discounts based on age or student status are fairly easy to police, which 
explains the popularity of age discounts and student discounts. Establishments police these discounts by 
observing consumers or requiring identification before purchase. See, e.g., SlugBooks, Student ID 
Discounts & Deals Cheatsheet, http://www.collegepackinglist.com/college-discounts-cheatsheet.html 
(last visited March 14, 2015) (listing companies that will give students discounts based on seeing their 
IDs). Establishments also generally employ contract law to prohibit reselling. For example, 
entertainment venues may prohibit transfers of tickets by treating the ticket “sale” for the event as a 
license to occupy a seat in the venue on a certain date at a certain time. Under the terms of the license 
(often printed on the back of the ticket) a number of conditions can void the license, including reselling 
or transferring the ticket. See Albert A. Foer, Who Owns My Ticket?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2012 
(discussing the practice and how some states have made or tried to make it illegal). 
145.  “Windows software is installed with floppy discs bought in large boxes with heavy 
instruction manuals.” A History of Windows: 1990–1994, MICROSOFT WINDOWS, http://windows. 
microsoft.com/en-us/windows/history#T1=era3 (last updated Nov. 2013). 
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single “program” at a time.146 For example, the early Commodore 64 (64 
signaling a memory capacity of 64 kilobytes of memory) required users, 
via the command prompt, to tell the operating system to run the piece of 
software that was loaded into the computer’s floppy disk drive.147 There 
was no “logging in” or identification process required to access the 
program, and there were no folders or files the way computer memory is 
arranged currently.148 New data had to be saved to floppy disks, and there 
was no auto-save function.149 
The development of new software was a difficult and time-consuming 
task, and most companies preferred to employ the “cathedral” method, 
through which software is “carefully crafted by individual wizards or small 
bands of mages working in splendid isolation, with no beta to be released 
before its time.”150 Software was tested, retested, and tested again before it 
was released for purchase.151 When users identified bugs, they learned to 
navigate around or through them.152 Sometimes independent coders would 
develop “fixes” for the bugs, which they shared with friends, or even 
published in newspapers or PC magazine articles.153 Patches or bug fixes 
were not generally released on an individual basis.154 While a typical home 
 
146.  For a description of the experience of using DOS, see Chris Hoffman, PCs Before 
Windows: What Using MS-DOS Was Actually Like, HOW-TO GEEK (May 11, 2014), http:// 
www.howtogeek.com/188980/pcs-before-windows-what-using-ms-dos-was-actually-like/. 
147.  Reid C. Swenson, What is a Commodore Computer?, OLDSOFTWARE.COM, http:// 
oldsoftware.com/history.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2015). 
148.  See id. 
149.  See id. 
150.  ERIC S. RAYMOND, THE CATHEDRAL AND THE BAZAAR: MUSINGS ON LINUX AND OPEN 
SOURCE BY AN ACCIDENTAL REVOLUTIONARY 29 (Tim O’Reilly ed., 1999) (comparing the corporate 
software development model, known as the “cathedral,” with the open-source community development 
model employed with Linux development, known as the “bazaar”). It is important for the reader to 
understand, however, that Linux’s open-source model relied upon access to an early form of 
inter/intranet access for developers to share ideas and improve the software on an ongoing basis. Id. 
151.  For a historical timeline of such testing, see Joris Meerts & Dorothy Graham, The History of 
Software Testing, TESTING REFERENCES, http://www.testingreferences.com/testinghistory.php (last 
visited Sept. 28, 2015). 
152.  Bugs could, however, have disastrous consequences depending on the context. For a 
collection of such stories, see Simson Garfinkel, History’s Worst Software Bugs, WIRED MAG. (Nov. 8, 
2005), http://archive.wired.com/software/coolapps/news/2005/11/69355?currentPage=all. 
153.  See, e.g., Bruce Brown, Bugout, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 23, 1995, at C3 (suggesting a way to 
work around a bug that caused printing problems in Microsoft Excel). 
154.  Bill Gates is reported to have said: “There are no significant bugs in our released software 
that any significant number of users want fixed . . . . I’m saying: We don’t do a new version to fix bugs. 
We don’t. Not enough people would buy it.” Microsoft Code Has No Bugs (That Microsoft Cares 
About), FOCUS, Oct. 23, 1995, at 206, http://www.cantrip.org/nobugs.html.  
[U]pdates or upgrades to software were generally delivered by—and often installed by—
tech support. Updates were also relatively infrequent. However, as viruses and other 
malware threats increased in number and severity in the following decades, operating 
systems and antivirus applications began to require more frequent updates. 
 
3 MANTA AND OLSON 135-187 (DO NOT DELETE) 11/5/2015  8:50 AM 
2015] Hello Barbie 163 
computer today constantly checks for, downloads, and installs “updates,” 
for the multitude of software programs stored on the hard drive,155 there 
was no method for performing such a check before the existence of the 
World Wide Web.156 Producers generally waited to fix a bug by improving 
the software in the next release.157 On the earliest computers, there was not 
even a hard drive onto which a user would load the software—it ran off the 
floppy disk.158 Even with the advent of the hard drive, there were no 
upgrades, and the user had to weigh the costs in time and money to install a 
new version of a program.159 
For example, Windows 3.0 was released in 1990 and is widely 
regarded as the first truly successful Windows release, due in part to the 
introduction of virtual memory.160 Windows 3.0 was one of the first 
software programs to release upgrades, which were sold as 3.0a, “a 
maintenance release, resolving bugs and improving stability.”161 The 
upgrades were optional purchases, and oftentimes users waited until an 
entirely new version was released to upgrade rather than buy the bug 
fixes.162 
 
Jaime Henriquez, 10 Ways Tech Support Has Changed Since the 1980s, TECHREPUBLIC (Aug. 9, 2013, 
12:48 PM), http://www.techrepublic.com/blog/10-things/10-ways-tech-support-has-changed-since-the-
1980s/. 
155.  Understanding Windows Automatic Updating, MICROSOFT WINDOWS, http://windows. 
microsoft.com/en-us/windows/understanding-windows-automatic-updating#1TC=windows-7 (last 
visited Sept. 28, 2015). 
156.  For an argument that the video game console industry launched consumer “lust” for 
upgrades, see Joshua Topolsky, Welcome to the Age of the Upgrade, VERGE (Dec. 31, 2013, 3:03 PM), 
http://www.theverge.com/2013/12/31/5261042/welcome-to-the-age-of-the-upgrade (“I believe it was 
this moment—the moment of the Genesis, TurboGrafx-16, and eventually the SNES—that changed 
consumer attitudes about technology in our lives forever . . . [, when] the consumer learned that the 
thing you already owned was going to be replaced, and the replacement was going to be awesome.”). 
157.  See supra note 154. 
158.  Life Without Hard Disk Drives, THE PC GUIDE, http://www.pcguide.com/ref/hdd/ 
histWithout-c.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2015). Indeed, it appears that U.S. nuclear missiles are still 
operated via computers that run off of floppy disks rather than a hard drive. See Emily Thomas, Soooo 
Our Nuclear Missiles Are Run by Computers That Still Use 8-Inch Floppy Disks, HUFFINGTON POST 
(May 1, 2014, 1:59 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 2014/05/01/floppy-disk-nuclear-missile-
minuteman_n_5243367.html. 
159.  See, e.g., John Burgess, Do You Really Need a New Operating System? Weigh Cost, 
Advantage Before Buying, WASH. POST, Aug. 21, 1995, at E20 (discussing whether users should buy 
and install Windows 95 given the various hassles involved); Brit Hume, Low-Price Software Upgrades 
Sometimes Are No Bargain, WASH. POST, Dec. 13, 1993, at F20 (evaluating the costs of upgrading 
programs). 
160.  A History of Windows, supra note 145; Mark Ward, The End of an Era—Windows 3.x, BBC 
(last updated Nov. 5, 2008, 12:49 AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/7707016.stm. 
161.  Windows, MICROSOFT’S FANS, http://www.microsoftsfans.com/windows.html (under 
subheading “Success with Windows 3.0”) (last visited Sept. 28, 2015). 
162.  As one author has described: 
When software first became a consumer product in the 1980s, it was literally unchangeable. 
It was written on media that was write-once, placed in a physical box, shrink-wrapped, and 
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This pre-Internet method of distributing software was much more like a 
one-time sale of a product, rather than the “licensing” of something. 
Nevertheless, as we discuss in the previous Part,163 while at first some 
courts treated transactions between software companies and consumers as 
sales,164 courts generally allowed these transactions to be legally considered 
licensing transactions.165 The early cases upholding the characterization of 
software transfers as licensing rather than sale were subject to 
understandable criticism. Certainly these transactions had many of the 
hallmarks of sales rather than licenses.166 Nevertheless, we believe that it 
 
set on store shelves. Later releases of software in a box would likely include some bug fixes 
and minor feature additions, but conceptually, a software program was treated as any other 
kind of physical media—it was produced once, and if there were sufficient interest for a 
second edition or version, a user would be expected to purchase a completely new copy of 
the product. Until computer networking became ubiquitous, there was no straightforward 
method for computer software to be upgraded in-place, or “patched.” In the 1990s and early 
2000s, software updates were still done via formal release numbers and discrete new 
editions. The onus was on individual owners to find and acquire patches to update their own 
products, sometimes for free and on occasion by paying for an upgrade. 
Liza Daly, What We Can Do With “Books”, in BOOK: A FUTURIST’S MANIFESTO (Hugh McGuire & 
Brian O’Leary eds., 2012). 
163.  See supra Part II. 
164.  In SoftMan Products Co., LLC v. Adobe Sys., Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1075 (C.D. Cal. 2001), a 
district court held that when a software vendor transfers a copy of its software, that transfer should be 
viewed as a sale of goods rather than a license of intellectual property. Later rulings held that software 
is licensed, not sold. See, e.g., Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010). Today, many 
users still think they purchase software, and companies often release reminders that the software is 
licensed, not bought. See Zachary Knight, Microsoft Reminds Everyone: You Do Not Own Your 
Software, TECHDIRT WIRELESS (Dec. 16, 2011, 4:05 PM), https://www.techdirt.com/blog/wireless/ 
articles/20111209/08380617021/microsoft-reminds-everyone-you-do-not-own-your-software.shtml. 
165.  See sources cited supra note 100. 
166.  Notably, at the time, even software companies seemed to view the exchange of money for 
software between user and company as similar to the sale of a “thing.” For instance, Borland used a 
software license titled “Just Like a Book.” The EULA reads: 
This software is protected by both United States copyright law and international copyright 
treaty provisions. Therefore, you must treat this software just like a book, except that you 
may copy it onto a computer to be used and you may make archival copies of the software 
for the sole purpose of backing-up our software and protecting your investment from loss. 
By saying “just like a book,” Borland means, for example, that this software may be used by 
any number of people, and may be freely moved from one computer location to another, so 
long as there is no possibility of it being used at one location while it’s being used at another 
or on a computer network by more than one user at one location. Just like a book can’t be 
read by two different people in two different places at the same time, neither can the 
software be used by two different people in two different places at the same time. (Unless, of 
course, Borland’s copyright has been violated or the use is on a computer network by up to 
the number of users authorized by additional Borland licenses as explained below.) 
Thom Holwerda, Borland in the 1980’s: “Treat Software Just Like a Book”, OSNEWS (Oct. 15, 2009, 
2:47 PM), http://www.osnews.com/story/22342/Borland_in_the_1980s_Treat_Software_Just_ 
Like_a_Book_/ (emphases added). The “Just Like a Book” licensing approach was soon overtaken by 
the approach of licensing each copy of a software program to a specific machine. For instance, the 
Windows 3.1 licensing agreement for the most part limited its licensed use to installing the software 
copy on a single machine. Windows 3.1 Licensing Policy Allows for One Copy Per License, 
MICROSOFT SUPPORT (last reviewed Feb. 27, 2014), http://support.microsoft.com/kb/83926. 
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was better for the development and widespread distribution of software that 
courts treated software distribution as licensing rather than sales, even if to 
some extent this was merely a useful legal fiction. Had courts instead 
characterized these transfers of software from producers to consumers as 
sales, then the first sale doctrine would have applied and consumers would 
have been able to resell their software.167 Allowing consumers to resell 
digital software would have had a greater effect on the software market 
than the ability to sell used books and music ever had on the book and 
music markets. Books degrade with age and use, as do record albums and 
cassette tapes.168 Even CDs were relatively fragile media for purposes of 
everyday use for playing music.169 CDs historically had to be used each 
time the music was played, which could lead to scratching or damaging of 
the CDs over time and loss of music.170 Thus, while used books and music 
are partial substitutes for new books and music, they are far from perfect 
substitutes. When software was contained on floppy disks, the floppy disks 
had some of the fragility of the media used for books or music, although 
not to the same extent. While floppy disks were fairly sturdy, over time the 
magnetic recordings on them could degrade.171 
Hence, there was some difference between a used and new floppy disk 
containing software, especially as the used floppy disk aged. But for 
purposes of the software user, all she cared about was being able to load the 
software from the disk onto her computer. If the program on the floppy 
disk was non-corrupt at the time of loading, then it was not as crucial if the 
disk later became damaged,172 unlike for the purchaser of a CD, who would 
need the CD to remain undamaged to enjoy the music contained therein. 
Thus, used floppy disks were relatively better substitutes for new software 
 
167.  See supra Part II. 
168.  Indeed, some libraries are equipped with media preservation departments to deal with this 
exact problem. See, e.g., Media Preservation, HARVARD LIBRARY, http://library.harvard.edu/ 
preservation/media-preservation (last visited Sept. 28, 2015). In a nod to old cassette tapes, Sony has 
unveiled a modern tape that can hold millions of songs. Chris Coplan, R.I.P. iPod: Sony Unveils 
Cassette Tape That Can Hold 64,750,000 Songs, CONSEQUENCE OF SOUND (May 5, 2014, 8:45 AM), 
http://consequenceofsound.net/2014/05/r-i-p-ipod-sony-unveils-cassette-tape-that-can-hold-64750000-
songs/. 
169.  The unrecorded shelf life of a CD is between five and ten years. The experiential life 
expectancy, however, is two to five years. Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) about Optical Storage 
Media: Storing Temporary Records on CDs and DVDs, NATIONAL ARCHIVES, http://www. 
archives.gov/records-mgmt/initiatives/temp-opmedia-faq.html [https://web.archive.org/web/201506 
18201448/http://www.archives.gov/records-mgmt/initiatives/temp-opmedia-faq.html]. 
170.  See Tom Bishop, Is Music Safe on Compact Disc?, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
2/hi/entertainment/3940669.stm (last updated Aug. 27, 2004). 
171.  See Casey Morgan, Data Storage Lifespans: How Long Will Media Really Last?, 
STORAGECRAFT (Aug. 28, 2013), http://www.storagecraft.com/blog/data-storage-lifespan/. 
172.  Unless, of course, the computer hard drive developed problems and the program needed to 
be reloaded from the floppy disk onto the hard drive. 
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floppy disks than used books and music were for new books and music.173 
Used disks containing software were not perfect substitutes, however, 
because uncertainty about the condition of the data on these disks led to 
transaction and information costs that meant a buyer would not be willing 
to pay as much for a used disk, even if there were no copyright issues.174 
Had courts treated transfers of software from producers to consumers 
as sales subject to the first sale doctrine, the relative durability of floppy 
disks, and the need to use them only once per transfer, would have made 
price discrimination much more difficult. Any purchasers of lower-priced 
software could have easily resold it to those to whom the software producer 
wanted to charge higher prices. It is true that software producers could have 
combatted this somewhat by making cheaper versions less functional and 
offering more expensive versions with greater numbers of features. This 
would have allowed some rough second-degree price discrimination, so 
long as the users of the higher-priced version needed the additional 
features, and the users of the lower-priced version did not. But other than 
that, the first sale doctrine would have opened the door to arbitrage such 
that more nuanced price discrimination would have been impossible. 
In addition, allowing the resale of software would have made it much 
more difficult to detect copyright infringement of software. Under the 
current regime, software producers can monitor websites like eBay and 
Amazon Marketplace to check for copies of their software being sold.175 
 
173.  Compact Disc (CD), COMPUTER HISTORY MUSEUM, http://www.computerhistory.org/ 
revolution/memory-storage/8/262/1089 (“The Compact Disc (CD) was developed by Sony and Philips 
in 1982 for distributing music. DEC worked with them to store computer data, and it became the 
standard distribution media for software.”). At least this was the case when consumers listened to music 
repeatedly from the medium upon which they purchased the music. Now that many listeners 
immediately upload any music they buy on CD to a digital file on a computer, music CDs actually 
function much like software on a disk, in terms of substitutability for a new copy of the music. Even 
Amazon recommends purchasing a CD and “ripping” it to other sources. See Digital Decisions: Taking 
Your Media Beyond the Home Stereo, AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/gp/feature.html? 
docId=1000134651 (last visited Sept. 28, 2015). See also Rip (Copy) Songs from Your CDs to Your 
Computer, MICROSOFT WINDOWS, http://windows.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-xp/help/windows-
media-player/11/rip-a-cd (last visited Sept. 28, 2015) (“You can use Windows Media Player 11 to rip 
songs from your CDs to your computer so that they become files on your computer.”). 
174.  For a discussion on how perfect and imperfect substitutability affect market supply and 
demand in monopolistic new-used pricing models, see S. J. Liebowitz, Durability, Market Structure, 
and New-Used Goods Models, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 816, 820–22 (1982). But note that some libraries, 
especially those associated with educational institutions, may actually lend software to borrowers for 
short periods of time. See, e.g., Computer Hardware and Software to Checkout, EMORY U. CANDLER 
SCH. OF THEOLOGY PITTS THEOLOGICAL LIBR., http://pitts.emory.edu/borrow/circulatingtechnology. 
cfm (last visited Sept. 28, 2015). 
175.  In other countries that apply different sets of rules to software licensing, markets may exist 
in used software that cannot legally arise in the United States. See, e.g., USEDSOFT, https:// 
www.usedsoft.com/en/company/business-idea/ (last visited Sept. 28, 2015). Some have sought to 
introduce legislation in the United States that would restrict manufacturers’ ability to restrict resale of 
software-equipped products like smartphones. See Jon Healey, Opinion, New Bill Would Protect the 
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Any sales of software by consumers can be assumed to be infringing 
because software licenses generally prohibit consumer resale of software 
even on the original disks and in original packaging.176 If consumers had 
the right to resell their software, policing infringing copies would be much 
more difficult because it would be hard to tell the resold software from 
illegal copies. 
Nowadays, when digital files are stored on hard drives and shared over 
the Internet, software almost always can be transferred with perfect 
fidelity.177 Today, previously purchased digital programs, songs, movies, 
and the like can serve as perfect substitutes for purchasing these digital 
files directly from the producer. Accordingly, if consumers now could 
resell software, this would allow arbitrage at low transaction costs, thus 
destroying the ability of software producers to price discriminate. 
In sum, copyright protection, the treatment of transfers of software as 
licenses rather than sales, and the consequent lack of ability to resell 
software have combined together to facilitate price discrimination in the 
sale of software. This price discrimination has allowed software companies 
to make profits selling to high-value business users, but still offer their 
software at lower prices to lower-value consumers who have wanted to 
purchase the software for personal, noncommercial use. This has in turn 
resulted in the widespread proliferation of software among consumers, 
which has increased consumer and total welfare. This widespread 
distribution of software has created a particularly computer-savvy 
workforce, and thus contributed to the continuing productivity increases 
that the United States has witnessed.178 
 
Market for Used High-Tech Goods, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/ 
opinion-la/la-ol-farenthold-bill-first-sale-digital-devices-iphone-20140919-story.html. 
176.  Software producers disallow resale of software even on the original disk because they do 
not want consumers to buy the software on a disk, install it, and then resell the software. Amazon will 
not allow resale of certain software, including academic versions, original equipment manufacturer 
(OEM) products, or backup copies, while other types, such as video games, must be marked as “open 
box.” See Selling Software, AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html? 
nodeId=1199154 (last visited Sept. 28, 2015). 
177.  In actuality, of course, digital files are copied from one medium of storage to another, rather 
than being transferred. One can construct a protocol in which the original copy is deleted after the new 
copy is made, and thus mimic a transfer of the digital file, but what occurs is still copying. This was the 
method ReDigi used in the system that it set up for transferring iTunes songs and that was struck down 
in district court for copyright violation. See Capital Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
178.  See, e.g., Steve Lohr, Study Says Computers Give Big Boosts to Productivity, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 13, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/13/technology/13tech.html; Adam M. Zaretsky, 
Have Computers Made Us More Productive? A Puzzle, REGIONAL ECONOMIST, Oct. 1998, 
https://www.stlouisfed.org/publications/regional-economist/october-1998/have-computers-made-us-
more-productive-a-puzzle. 
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Software is generally characterized by very high research and 
development costs and very low distribution costs.179 The software 
producer must make up its cost of research and production in the sales price 
of its software, or it will lose money and eventually go out of business. The 
simplest way to attempt to cover costs would be to set a single price for the 
software, and then hope to sell enough copies to make up the costs of 
production and a return on investment. But software producers generally 
can sell more products and increase profits if they engage in price 
discrimination in setting prices for software distribution. An extended 
example using the Microsoft Office suite of software products will help to 
illustrate this point. 
Microsoft’s Office software is the dominant software for the creation of 
documents, spreadsheets, and audiovisual presentations.180 Microsoft’s 
costs to develop, test, produce, maintain, update, advertise, and sell its 
Office suite of software are, of course, substantial.181 To achieve any return 
on its investment, Microsoft must make up all of these costs in the sales of 
its Office software. A simplistic way for Microsoft to choose a price to 
cover its costs would be for the company to try to predict the number of 
copies of Office for which people will pay, and to divide its total costs by 
that number. It could then add an extra charge to each sale to ensure that it 
made profits and thus got a return for its investors. This would be pricing 
based on Average Total Cost.182 
But Microsoft does not just want to make up its costs and a small 
profit. The company wants to earn as much profit as it can on its highly 
demanded software. So Microsoft will not simply divide up its costs over 
its projected sales and then add on a profit. Instead, if Microsoft has market 
power, it will choose a price well above cost so as to maximize profits. 
This price may be a little above competitive level, or it may be at or near 
monopoly price, depending on the market power Microsoft has in its Office 
software suite. Although this can be represented graphically and 
 
179.  See Joseph P. Liu, Owning Digital Copies: Copyright Law and the Incidents of Copy 
Ownership, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1245, 1350 (2001). 
180.  People often refer to slideshows simply as “powerpoint presentations,” which shows how 
ubiquitous Microsoft’s presentation software has become. 
181.  According to Microsoft’s 2013 Annual Report, “[d]uring fiscal years 2013, 2012, and 2011, 
research and development expense was $10.4 billion, $9.8 billion, and $9.0 billion, respectively.” 
Microsoft Annual Report 2013, MICROSOFT, http://www.microsoft.com/investor/reports/ar13/financial-
review/business-description/research-development/index.html. While the report does not indicate 
exactly how much was spent on the development of Office, it is safe to assume that a significant portion 
of the R&D budget was used to create and improve this core product. 
182.  For a definition of average total cost and an explanation of its use in calculating economic 
profit at loss, see AUSTIN FRAKT & MIKE PIPER, MICROECONOMICS MADE SIMPLE 61–62, 68–70 
(2014). 
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mathematically,183 basically what a monopolist does when it sets a 
monopoly price is to make the price high enough that each sale is very 
profitable, but not so high as to drive away enough buyers that the high 
price becomes self-defeating. Put in economic terms, a monopolist sets 
prices at the level at which further increasing the price would lead to lower 
profits because too few sales would occur, but decreasing the price to sell 
more units would also decrease profitability because the increase in unit 
sales would not be great enough to make up for the revenue loss from 
decreasing the price.184 In the case of a software seller like Microsoft, if it 
had to set a single price for its software, it might find that its profits were 
maximized at a relatively high price that only businesses and consumers 
who greatly value the software could afford. If Microsoft set a single high 
price, then many consumers would never get to buy and use the software 
for personal use. It is in Microsoft’s interest, however, to sell to these 
consumers who value the software at less than a single profit-maximizing 
price. If Microsoft could somehow sell to these consumers for a lower price 
that is still above cost without disrupting its high-price sales to the business 
community, then the company would do so because it would make more 
profits. And, indeed, this is exactly what Microsoft and other software 
distributors do. 
Software producers employed price discrimination from early on in the 
distribution of software. Software is particularly suited to price 
discrimination because software is an example of a good with large 
investment and development costs but a marginal cost of distribution that 
approaches zero.185 Especially now that a great deal of software is 
distributed via downloads, the cost of distributing an additional copy of a 
program is basically a fraction of the cost of maintaining the sales web 
interface, the price of the servers hosting the program, and the cost of 
accounting for the sale. Because the marginal cost of distribution is so low 
for software, if a software producer can sell extra copies of its program for 
anywhere much above zero without cannibalizing sales at a higher price 
point, the producer has every motive to do so. Microsoft historically has 
applied some rough price discrimination in selling Office. The company 
traditionally has charged more to business users, while including some 
 
183.  See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 117, at 1804 (illustrating economic effects of price 
discrimination); Fisher, supra note 100, at 23–24 (displaying graphically two monopolistic pricing 
scenarios, one allowing price discrimination while the other does not); Lunney, supra note 100, at 409–
14 (explaining at length, using both mathematical formulae and graphical representations, two price 
discrimination models). 
184.  To be exact, a monopolist stops decreasing prices just before the point at which marginal 
cost would exceed marginal revenue. 
185.  See Liu, supra note 179. 
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extra functionality with the software.186 Microsoft has also offered various 
options to large businesses, like allowing all of the business’s employees to 
use the software for a fixed price, or charging “seat” licenses, i.e., fees per 
employee using the software.187 Microsoft generally has sold a less robust 
version of its Office suite to individual consumers for a lower price 
point.188 The company has also offered educational versions of its software, 
which are basically the same as the home version, but are sold at a still 
lower price point.189 Microsoft has used these methods of price 
discrimination as a means of engaging in rough-cut second- and third-
degree price discrimination. 
Microsoft knew that business owners were likely to value its software 
more because the software can be an important input to a business’s 
productivity. Thus, Microsoft wanted to sell to those customers at a higher 
price. The company was also aware that individual consumers want to use 
the same software that most of the country uses and with which they are 
likely already familiar from work or school.190 At the same time, Microsoft 
realized that many individual consumers are not willing to pay the same 
rate as businesses. Individual consumers typically do not value productivity 
software as much for their personal use as a business enterprise values it for 
business use. Microsoft was probably aware that if the price became too 
high for home consumers, they likely would substitute with some other 
software that may seem inferior, but that they would prefer to a high-priced 
Microsoft Office. Other home consumers might simply forgo having this 
type of software at all if the Microsoft price was too high and there were no 
acceptable substitutes. 
While Microsoft traditionally distributed and sold its software using the 
price discrimination methods just described, times have changed, and so 
has the way that software is developed, released, and regularly updated. 
The relationship between software producers and consumers has shifted 
from one of software producers providing software products on a one-time 
basis to consumers to one of software producers entering ongoing 
 
186.  Compare Office 365 Business Plans, MICROSOFT OFFICE, https://products.office.com/en-
us/business/compare-office-365-for-business-plans (last visited Sept. 28, 2015). 
187.  Compare All Office 365 for Business Plans, MICROSOFT OFFICE, https://products.office. 
com/en-us/business/compare-more-office-365-for-business-plans (last visited Sept. 28, 2015). 
188.  Buy Office 365 Personal, MICROSOFT OFFICE, https://products.office.com/en-us/office-365-
personal (last visited Sept. 28, 2015). 
189.  Office 365 Education Plan, MICROSOFT OFFICE, https://products.office.com/en-
us/academic/compare-office-365-education-plans (last visited Sept. 28, 2015). 
190.  See, e.g., MICHAEL B. BECRAFT, BILL GATES: A BIOGRAPHY 70 (2014) (“Microsoft helped 
secure the company’s own success through path dependence . . . . If commercial and home users 
become exceptionally comfortable with Windows and Microsoft Office, there becomes little incentive 
to change to a different operating system and application.”). 
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relationships with consumers in which they provide continually changing 
software and service. From productivity software to software for games and 
entertainment, the norm has shifted from one-time transactions to ongoing 
relationships, pursuant to which the consumer expects, and regularly 
receives, bug fixes, security patches, and updates that improve the 
performance of the software. Software applications (“apps”) for 
smartphones provide a prime example. When a consumer downloads an 
app for a smartphone, she expects that as she upgrades her operating 
system software on her phone, the app developers will keep pace and 
release updates to ensure that the app works well on multiple versions of 
the operating system software.191 The relationship between the software 
manufacturer and the consumer has changed from that of a seller and a 
purchaser to that of an ongoing service relationship between a software 
producer and a user. Depending on the software and the relationship, there 
will be different financial transactions during the course of the 
relationship—no longer does the relationship look like that of a one-time 
sale. Accordingly, not only does the legal classification of license facilitate 
price discrimination in software distribution, it is now also the 
classification most factually accurate in describing the relationship.192 
The change in the relationship between software producers and 
consumers to one of ongoing service also gives software producers an 
opportunity that they never had previously. Because of the regular contact 
between producers and consumers, producers now have the opportunity to 
monitor very closely who uses software and how they use it. It is well 
known that Internet users are closely monitored in their use of the 
Internet.193 Companies gather and collate extensive data on people’s 
personal characteristics, interests, Internet surfing, online purchasing, and 
social media posts and usage.194 Increasingly, data aggregators tie this 
information about people’s online lives to information gathered from other 
companies, including mail-order or brick-and-mortar purchases, magazine 
subscriptions, demographic data, real-estate records, income data, and 
 
191.  See, e.g., Old Versions of Windows, Mac, and Linux Software, Apps & Abandonware 
Games, OLDVERSION.COM, http://www.oldversion.com (last visited Sept. 28, 2015) (making available 
older versions of software). 
192.  Nor is it important whether a consumer pays a single time to enter this license relationship. 
Some have argued that the sale versus license determination should be based on whether payments are 
ongoing, but this reifies superficial financing choices above the actual characteristics of the ongoing 
services being provided. For a discussion of this topic, see Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 72, at 
1255–60 (2014). 
193.  See generally Lauren E. Willis, Why Not Privacy by Default?, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 61 
(2014). 
194.  See Michael Mattioli, Disclosing Big Data, 99 MINN. L. REV. 535 (2014) (describing these 
techniques). 
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voting registration and habits.195 “Big data” is widely hailed as the future of 
advertising, loyalty programs, fundraising, and get-out-the-vote efforts.196 
There is a robust discussion of whether this data collection and aggregation 
is a good thing.197 For purposes of this Article, we assume that these 
practices are already prevalent and will only increase in the future. 
Just because software producers can monitor consumers in myriad 
ways does not mean that they will. An active and vigilant constituency 
watches for perceived excessive data gathering and invasions of consumer 
privacy.198 There are regular announcements and news stories about 
companies revising their monitoring of consumers and their terms and 
conditions of use agreements in the face of public criticism of data-
gathering practices. Thus, while it becomes ever easier to monitor users, 
some types of monitoring will likely be avoided because of the “creepy 
factor” and probable consumer backlash thereto.199 It is especially 
objectionable to privacy advocates and many consumers when data is 
gathered on consumers and not anonymized.200  
C. The Costs and Benefits of Enabling More Perfect Price Discrimination 
for Software 
The evolution in the relationship between software producers and 
users, increased ability to monitor users, and very low marginal cost of 
distributing software are making more fine-tuned price discrimination 
 
195.  See id. 
196.  See, e.g., Jane Yakowitz, Tragedy of the Data Commons, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2011) 
(arguing in favor of some of the uses of big data). 
197.  See, e.g., JOHN PALFREY & URS GASSER, BORN DIGITAL: UNDERSTANDING THE FIRST 
GENERATION OF DIGITAL NATIVES 79 (2008); David Grey & Danielle Citron, The Right to Quantitative 
Privacy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 62 (2013) (discussing the implications that data collection and aggregation 
have on the Fourth Amendment); Andrew J. McClurg, A Thousand Words Are Worth a Picture: A 
Privacy Tort Response to Consumer Data Profiling, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 63 (2003) (arguing that tort law 
should be used to address the privacy threat from consumer data profiling). 
198.  One of these organizations is the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC). See 
ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER, https://www.epic.org (last visited Sept. 28, 2015). 
199.  See, e.g., Jeremy Bailenson, Your Kinect Is Watching You, SLATE (Mar. 7, 2012, 6:40 AM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/gaming/2012/03/kinect_research_the_amazing_disturbing_thi
ngs_your_gaming_console_can_learn_about_you_.html (describing the risks of having a game console 
watch its users); Benjy Sarlin, Microsoft Backtracks on Xbox One Camera Amid Spying Fears, MSNBC 
(Sept. 13, 2013, 8:47 AM), http://www.msnbc.com/hardball/microsoft-backtracks-xbox-one-camera-
amid (“Microsoft will no longer require users of its upcoming Xbox One game console to attach its 
advanced camera, Kinect, in order to play. The move comes after gamers expressed concern that the 
device . . . could facilitate spying by the National Security Agency or hackers.”). 
200.  “Anonymizing” in the industry refers to steps taken so that data on consumers can be 
reviewed and parsed without the data being identifiable with a particular consumer by name. Among 
the ways that data can be anonymized are by aggregating it, by stripping out names and other personally 
identifying information, or by substituting pseudonyms for actual identifying information. See 
Yakowitz, supra note 196, at 44–47 (describing methods for anonymization). 
3 MANTA AND OLSON 135-187 (DO NOT DELETE) 11/5/2015  8:50 AM 
2015] Hello Barbie 173 
possible, and will continue to do so in the future, as software producers 
increasingly know more about the preferences of their users and have many 
contacts with them that can facilitate differential pricing. 
In the future, software companies will progressively know more about 
the users of their software. This information will let producers make better 
guesses about users’ willingness to pay. Combining restrictive software 
licenses with the increased ability to monitor the use of software will allow 
software producers to engage in increasingly precise price discrimination. 
Put plainly, software producers can license software to be used on only a 
single machine, or only by a single person, and with conditions such as no 
commercial use. Producers will be able to monitor that the users follow the 
conditions by having the software report back to the producer. Generally, 
software producers will not use the most pervasive monitoring available to 
them because the public backlash would be costly.201 But software 
producers will increasingly be able to monitor for usage of the software 
relevant to the producers’ purposes while not invading users’ privacy to the 
point of a damaging outcry. 
Software producers have already begun to refine their price 
discrimination and user monitoring. A look at Microsoft and Google 
provides examples. In June of 2011, Microsoft launched an online-based 
subscription service called Office 365.202 The service offers access, 
typically paid for on an annual subscription basis, to its most popular 
Office Suite programs including Word, Excel, PowerPoint, Publisher, and 
OneNote.203 The subscriptions also offer free data storage on Microsoft’s 
cloud-based server, OneDrive.204 There are a variety of plans available, 
based primarily on the number of users and devices that have access. 
Microsoft uses Office 365 as a way to price discriminate amongst 
various users. Office 365 Personal allows only one user to use the program 
on one computer, tablet, and phone for $69.99 per year.205 The user is also 
 
201.  Lee Rainie & Janna Anderson, The Future of Privacy: Elaborations: More Expert 
Responses, PEW RES. CTR. (Dec. 18, 2014), http://www.pewinternet.org/2014/12/18/elaborations-more-
expert-responses-4/ (Laural Papworth: “Products that damage fidelity will be destroyed by mass word-
of-mouth media before they get too far. Rights will be managed, not because of any ethical behavior, 
but because not to will be bad for business.”). 
202.  Microsoft Launches Office 365 Globally, MICROSOFT NEWS CTR. (June 28, 2011), 
http://news.microsoft.com/2011/06/28/microsoft-launches-office-365-globally/. 
203.  For a list of programs offered in the subscription plans, see, for example, Buy Office 365 
Home, MICROSOFT STORE, http://www.microsoftstore.com/store/msusa/en_US/pdp/Office-365-
Home/productID.286395000 (last visited Sept. 28, 2015). 
204.  Id. 
205.  Buy Microsoft Office 365 Personal, MICROSOFT STORE, http://www.microsoftstore.com/ 
store/msusa/en_US/pdp/Office-365-Personal/productID.297833200 (last visited Sept. 28, 2015). See 
also Microsoft License Terms, MICROSOFT, http://www.microsoft.com/en-us/UseTerms (last visited 
Sept. 28, 2015) [hereinafter “Office EULA”]. 
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granted one terabyte (1 TB) of storage on OneDrive.206 Office 365 Home is 
offered for only $30 more annually than Personal.207 Home allows up to 5 
users to use the software across five computers, tablets, and phones for 
$99.99 per month.208 The significant discount for use by an entire family 
makes sense, given that most people are probably unwilling to pay $69.99 
for each child to use Office, but they are willing to pay an additional $30 
per year to enable their family to use Office. Microsoft also discounts for 
students and educators by offering Office 365 for only $79.99 for four 
years to people in these groups.209 Again, this discounting makes sense 
assuming that students and teachers are not willing to pay nearly as much, 
on average, for Office, but consider it worth at least $20 per year. And 
ensuring that students are familiar and comfortable with Office can drive 
sales of the full-price licenses when those students graduate and are in the 
market for full-priced software. 
Microsoft also offers at least five types of licenses for Office 365 for 
business users, ranging from $5 per user per month to $20 per user per 
month, depending on the level of functionality and number of users.210 
Along with the Office suite of software, and depending on their 
subscription type, both home and business users get cloud storage of 
documents, frequent updates, and a number of other services like email, 
calendaring, and video conferencing.211 Microsoft’s subscription service 
lets Microsoft easily keep in touch with where and how its software is 
being used. If a user does not connect Office 365 to the Internet regularly, 
the software functionality is downgraded to only very basic features.212 
This allows Microsoft to ensure that the software checks in regularly, at 
which point Microsoft can catch instances of multiple copies of the 
software being used or other violations of its terms of service. All of this 
 
206.  Buy Microsoft Office 365 Personal, supra note 205. 
207.  Buy Microsoft Office 365 Home, MICROSOFT STORE, http://www.microsoftstore.com/ 
store/msusa/en_US/pdp/Office-365-Home/productID.286395000 (last visited Sept. 28, 2015). 
208.  Id. 
209.  Buy Microsoft Office 365 University, MICROSOFT STORE, http://www.microsoftstore.com/ 
store/msusa/en_US/pdp/Office-365-University/productID.275549300 (last visited Sept. 28, 2015). 
University grants a license for four years, with one opportunity to renew at the end of the third year, for 
another four years. Id. The license is good for up to two PCs or tablets and one phone, and also includes 
60 minutes of Skype time for making Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) calls on the Skype platform. 
Id.; see also Office EULA, supra note 205. 
210.  Compare All Office 365 for Business Plans, supra note 187. 
211.  Id. 
212.  See Susan Harkins, 10+ Things You Should Know Before Buying Office 365, 
TECHREPUBLIC (Nov. 26, 2013, 11:04 AM), http://www.techrepublic.com/blog/10-things/10-things-
you-should-know-before-buying-office-365/ (describing the need to connect to the Internet for full 
functionality). 
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allows Microsoft greater flexibility to price discriminate and greater ability 
to monitor use of its software. 
Google Drive offers similar online storage plans for both personal and 
business use,213 and several apps that are compatible with the Microsoft 
Office Suite.214 For example, Google Docs is a word-processing program— 
similar to Word—which will convert Word files into Docs files, and Docs 
files can be converted into Word files.215 Google has other programs 
available as well, such as Sheets (a substitute for Excel) and Slides (a 
substitute for PowerPoint).216 Yet the file conversion process can, and often 
does, alter formatting and fonts, especially in the instance of proprietary 
fonts.217 Apple similarly uses Pages, Sheets, and KeyNote to convert Word, 
Excel, and PowerPoint respectively, each of which experiences similar 
conversion issues.218 Apple’s productivity software acts as a substitute for 
Microsoft’s software, and thus helps to constrain pricing for the Office 
suite and Office 365. Google’s much more basic productivity programs are 
inferior substitutes219 but still apply some pricing pressure.220 
 
213.  Using Google Drive, GOOGLE DRIVE, https://www.google.com/drive/using-drive/ (last 
visited Sept. 28, 2015). 
214.  See, e.g., Google Docs, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/docs/about/ (last visited Sept. 28, 
2015); Google Sheets, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/sheets/about/ (last visited Sept. 28, 2015); 
Google Slides, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/slides/about/ (last visited Sept. 28, 2015). 
215.  Google Docs, supra note 214. 
216.  Google Sheets, supra note 214; Google Slides, supra note 214. 
217.  The Microsoft Office EULA limits the use of certain fonts. See, e.g., Office EULA, supra 
note 205 (“While the software is running, you may use its fonts to display and print content. You may 
temporarily download the fonts to a printer or other output device to print content, and you may embed 
fonts in content only as permitted by the embedding restrictions in the fonts.”). Examples of restricted 
fonts that are available in Word but not Google Docs are Calibri and Cambria; examples of fonts 
available in Docs but not Word are Sigmar One and Just Me Again Down Here. See id. 
218.  John Rizzo, iWork and Office: Can They Work Together?, MACWORLD (June 12, 2008, 
12:00 PM), http://www.macworld.com/article/1133922/iworkoffice.html (describing some of the 
conversion issues). 
219.  Google’s programs treat standard Microsoft features as functionality add-ons, such as a 
thesaurus, label creators, highlighting, and clip art. Overview of Add-Ons, GOOGLE, 
https://support.google.com/docs/answer/3641454?hl=en (last visited Sept. 28, 2015). Google states that 
its intention in providing bare-bones productivity programs is to increase speed, but many users who 
have become accustomed to standard Word features become frustrated by the need to activate and 
install an add-on for what they perceive to be basic functions. See Will Kelly, 5 Apps That Help 
Microsoft Office and Google Apps Play Nice Together, LIFEHACK, http://www.lifehack. 
org/articles/technology/5-apps-that-help-microsoft-office-and-google-apps-play-nice-together.html (last 
visited Sept. 28, 2015) (acknowledging that Docs and Word are not always easily compatible); Ian Paul 
& Matt Egan, Top 12 Google Docs Tips: Fix Google Docs Annoyances—How Your Business Can Get 
More from Google Docs, TECHWORLD (Aug. 3, 2015), http://www.techworld.com/tutorial/apps/top-12-
google-docs-annoyances-how-fix-them-3343873/ (addressing common complaints about Google Docs 
being “infuriating, incomplete, and limited”). 
220.  Google makes money from consumers who use its programs by data mining and selling 
advertising, rather than by charging consumers directly. See Ryan Singel, How Does Google Make the 
Big Bucks? An Infographic Answer, WIRED MAG. (July 19, 2011, 10:44 AM), http://www.wired.com/ 
2011/07/google-revenue-sources/. For a general discussion of how some forms of price discrimination 
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As computing increasingly moves to the cloud, these opportunities to 
price discriminate and monitor increasingly will be available to software 
producers. The evolution of cloud computing and pervasive monitoring 
will greatly increase the ability of software producers to price discriminate. 
Take Microsoft’s Office 365 Home subscription, which is designed to 
allow families to use the software at a discount price per person. If five 
unrelated working adults decided to share the subscription, they would be 
taking advantage of a discount that Microsoft did not intend to offer, and 
that is not as profitable to Microsoft. With better monitoring abilities, 
Microsoft can specify in its terms of service that the home edition is only 
for members of a single household, or single family, and then be able to 
monitor compliance with those terms. This will allow Microsoft to fine 
tune its price discrimination strategy. 
But this is only the beginning. With increased monitoring ability, 
Microsoft can begin to price discriminate with ever-greater particularity. 
For instance, rather than offering a Home subscription for up to five users, 
Microsoft could price differently for each additional user and could further 
discriminate based on the age of the user. Based on monitoring usage, 
software producers will be able to know just who is using their software, 
and how much. This will enable producers to prevent users from evading 
price discrimination—e.g., the hypothetical five working adults would be 
prevented from sharing a Microsoft Office 365 Home subscription. But it 
will also allow software producers to offer really low prices to specific 
users. For instance, a single parent with a ten-year-old child may not think 
it worth paying the extra $30 per year for an Office 365 Home license. But 
that parent might think it worth $5 per year to have the license allowing a 
second account and installation on the child’s computer or tablet. If 
Microsoft can adequately ensure that only the ten-year-old will use such an 
account, then it is in Microsoft’s interest to offer such a license. The same 
goes for licenses of software to the elderly, to casual users, and to poorer 
users. 
Producers will be able to further refine their price discrimination via 
cloud computing because they will be able to gather an even greater wealth 
of data as to the use of their software.221 It will become increasingly easy 
for software producers to tell who is using their software a lot and who is 
using it only a little. If a person who only rarely uses the software declines 
 
drive customers toward alternative forms of software, see Peter Sheldon, Losing Customers with Price 
Discrimination?, GETELASTIC ECOMMERCE BLOG (Sept. 3, 2010), http://www.getelastic.com/ 
customer-retention/. 
221.  See generally Jay P. Kesan et al., Information Privacy and Data Control in Cloud 
Computing: Consumers, Privacy Preferences, and Market Efficiency, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 341 
(2013). 
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to renew a subscription, then the producer may choose to make a special 
discount offer to that user, realizing that the user has a low reservation 
price.222 Likewise, the producer would like to charge the “power user” 
more and will seek ways of doing so. Because simply charging one person 
more than another without offering anything extra often provokes bad will, 
the producers will come up with clever strategies to seem to offer more 
such as to raise prices. For instance, if via careful monitoring of its users, a 
software producer realizes that power users of its software tend to regularly 
use macros, and others do not, the producer may allow macro functionality 
only with more expensive licenses to the software. This is just one 
example. A significant proportion of the mobile apps industry relies on 
similar principles, from different degrees of functionality in Microsoft 
Office for iPad223 to the multitudinous ways in which software products 
such as games rely on the possibility of in-app purchases.224 Many other 
techniques will be developed to further refine price discrimination. 
In general, finer-grained price discrimination will decrease the 
consumer surplus of high-value software users. Put plainly, those willing to 
pay more will be made to pay more, and thus will be less well off than they 
would be absent price discrimination. This does not, however, reduce total 
welfare—it is merely a transfer from consumer to producer.225 But because 
marginal costs of software distribution are so low, users who value 
software less—especially poor users—will be offered the software at prices 
 
222.  In some ways, this will be similar to the way that real-time data collection on gamblers has 
revolutionized the casino industry. This began when Harrah’s Casino hired a Harvard Business School 
professor as a consultant and eventually as CEO. He adopted the use of data analytics to track clients 
and determine things like when a gambler was likely to give up and leave. By doing things like 
approaching such a gambler with an offer of complimentary goods, services, or chips, Harrah’s was 
able to significantly increase time in the casino and money spent per gambler. See Gary W. Loveman, 
Diamonds in the Data Mine, HARV. BUS. REV., May 2003, https://hbr.org/2003/05/diamonds-in-the-
data-mine/ar/1 (describing the model). 
223.  Karen Haslam, How to Get Word, Excel and PowerPoint on Your iPad or iPhone, 
MACWORLD, Mar. 2, 2015, http://www.macworld.co.uk/how-to/iosapps/how-get-microsoft-office-
word-excel-powerpoint-iphone-ipad-ios-3452845/ (mentioning how a subscription to Office 365 will 
unlock features such as “advanced change tracking features, no limits on the ways you can use 
paragraph styles, and advanced chart, table, and picture formatting tools. And if you're planning on 
using OneDrive for business documents, you will be required to purchase an Office 365 account.”).  
224.  See generally ERIC BENJAMIN SEUFERT, FREEMIUM ECONOMICS: LEVERAGING ANALYTICS 
AND USER SEGMENTATION TO DRIVE REVENUE (THE SAVVY MANAGER’S GUIDES) (2014). 
225.  How one feels about this may depend on how one feels about consumers or producers 
having more surplus after a transaction, and it may especially depend on who the particular producers 
and consumers are. If the producers are large corporations with record profits and the consumers whose 
surplus is being taken are poor widows and orphans, this seems distasteful in the least. On the other 
hand, if the consumers are wealthy trust-fund beneficiaries, and the producers are artisans from an 
impoverished shantytown, one might be happy to see additional surplus transferred from consumers to 
producers. The point is that transfers of surplus are not automatically good or bad. So long as the 
market operates efficiently, and allocative efficiency is not decreased, the total welfare of a society is 
not hurt by such transfers. 
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they can afford. This will be of great benefit to these lower-value, and often 
poorer, software users.226 In addition, the more fine-grained a monopolist’s 
price discrimination, the better the chances that total welfare will increase. 
If a monopolist can engage in fine-grained price discrimination 
approaching perfect price discrimination, then total welfare is increased, 
and welfare for all consumers who are willing to pay a price below market 
price but above cost is increased. In this case, the producer transfers almost 
all consumer surplus to itself. But all of those consumers who previously 
could not buy the product are better off, and allocative efficiency is 
increased. 
Not all software products have significant market power, however. 
Indeed, even with copyright and patent protection, some software has close 
enough substitutes that the market is quite competitive.227 Because the 
marginal cost of distributing software approaches zero, even in somewhat 
competitive software markets, allowing near-perfect price discrimination 
will increase total welfare. In competitive markets, in the long run, all 
producers sell at cost, and thus all consumers are offered competitive 
prices.228 Producers, however, may at times sell at prices above variable 
cost, but below total cost.229 This may happen, for instance, when a bumper 
crop makes the price of wheat drop below the total cost to produce it, but 
above the variable cost to harvest the wheat from the field. In this case, 
harvesting and selling the wheat does not make a profit for the farmer, but 
it does reduce his losses.230 Further, a producer should be willing to sell an 
additional unit at any price down to the level of marginal cost, so long as 
those low-price sales do not undermine the ability of the producer in the 
long run to sell at a price high enough to cover total costs. For goods with 
extremely low marginal costs, like software, producers could profitably 
license their software to some consumers at prices approaching zero, so 
long as those low-price offers did not undermine licensing to many 
consumers at the higher prices necessary to cover total cost. 
It is not only low-value users in the United States who benefit from 
perfect price discrimination; rather, many people in the developing world 
would also be able to purchase desired software for the first time. If 
software producers could prevent reselling of software they provided to 
 
226.  For a discussion of how price discrimination can benefit the poor, see, for example, Fisher, 
supra note 100. 
227.  See, e.g., Debabrata Dey et al., Quality Competition and Market Segmentation in the 
Security Software Market 38 MIS Q. 589, 591 (2014) (“[M]ost vendors offer nearly identical products, 
despite being in a severely competitive market.”). 
228.  See MANKIW, supra note 104, at 314. 
229.  See Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 217, 248–49 
(1993). 
230.  ROGER A. ARNOLD, ECONOMICS 501–02 (10th ed. 2010). 
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hospitals, libraries, schools, orphanages, and nonprofit companies in the 
developing world, software producers would have an incentive to offer 
their products at very low prices to organizations and people in 
impoverished communities. Medical monitoring programs could be 
licensed to health organizations in poor communities to enable better 
medical care. Sophisticated software used by professional architects, 
engineers, and computer scientists could be licensed for very low rates to 
certain schools and students unable to pay much. These are but a few 
examples of how enabling increasingly perfect price discrimination can 
benefit people who otherwise will never be able to afford software at 
unitary market pricing.231 
In sum, facilitating increasingly perfect software price discrimination is 
a way to ensure more widespread distribution of software to greater 
numbers of users who value the software above marginal cost, but below 
market price. Under a system of near-perfect price discrimination and 
monitoring, virtually everyone who values software at a price above zero 
should be able to get that software. 
IV. SOFTWARE LICENSING AND THE INTERNET OF THINGS 
In the near future, household appliances, automobiles, toys, and 
consumer products increasingly will be computerized and will 
communicate via the Internet with other computers and devices.232 The 
interconnection and intercommunication of these devices is only expected 
to accelerate in the coming years.233 A number of commentators have 
argued that unless we act quickly, a dystopian future is bearing down on us 
as the reality of the “Internet of Things” draws nearer.234 Christina 
Mulligan has stated recently that as software becomes increasingly present 
in consumer goods, manufacturers will include restrictive software licenses 
in sales of their products, which licenses will limit what consumers can do 
 
231.  Note that geographic price discrimination can be carried out via software licensing, whereas 
the Supreme Court has ruled that it cannot be accomplished through the 17 U.S.C. § 106 importation 
right for copyrighted products lawfully sold overseas, because the first sale doctrine trumps the 
importation right in that circumstance. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1355–56 
(2013). 
232.  In many ways, of course, that future is now. Numerous consumer products and appliances 
are already communicating via the Internet, including thermostats, appliances, security systems, baby 
monitors, utility meters, bathroom scales, coffee pots, DVRs, lighting systems, door locks, heat and air 
conditioning systems, cars, etc. See Peppet, supra note 6, at 109. 
233.  See id. at 89. 
234.  See Rainie & Anderson, supra note 201 (“The situation will worsen as the Internet of 
Things arises and people’s homes, workplaces, and the objects around them will ‘tattle’ on them. The 
incentives for businesses to monetize people’s data and governments to monitor behavior are extremely 
potent.”). 
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with the goods themselves.235 Her argument is that companies will utilize 
licenses to the software contained in devices to drastically restrict both the 
uses of the devices and the resale or transfer of devices.236 Accordingly, she 
and others argue, lawmakers and the courts should consider preventing the 
use of idiosyncratic copyright software licenses.237 
We believe that these commentators’ fears are misplaced, and that to 
the extent producers use licensing provisions to constrain the use of their 
devices, for the most part market realities will force such restrictions to be 
limited to when they can provide welfare enhancement. We agree that some 
companies will attach restrictive licensing terms to the products they sell as 
a way to constrain consumer resale and facilitate price discrimination. But 
for reasons we will explain, generally it simply will not be in companies’ 
interests to hamper consumers’ uses of goods.238 Most often, if companies 
restrict consumer devices in ways that make them less valuable to 
consumers, then consumers will not be willing to pay as much for the 
devices, and companies’ profits will suffer.239 
Price discrimination when it comes to consumer goods and appliances 
can prove beneficial for total welfare and for poorer consumers for the 
reasons set forth above in our discussion of software price discrimination. 
Although the marginal cost of consumer goods and appliances is much 
higher than that of software, many of these goods may still be able to be 
sold at a lower price point if price discrimination is practiced. Likewise, 
software licenses tied to consumer products can facilitate a range of price-
discrimination techniques that enhance metering of use and therefore 
benefit low-volume users. 
Those worried about the exploitation of software licenses to restrict 
consumers’ uses of the devices make the following arguments. First, given 
that courts treat software transfers from producers to consumers as 
licensing transactions rather than sales, producers can attach many 
conditions and restrictions on these transfers, and can use licensing to 
escape the first sale doctrine. Second, producers will include license 
agreements to the software contained in Internet of Things devices. Third, 
producers will make these licenses very restrictive. They will restrict the 
ability of consumers to transfer or resell the devices. They will restrict 
 
235.  See Mulligan, supra note 38, at 44–46. 
236.  See id. at 42–43. 
237.  Id. at 42–44, 57. 
238.  Manufacturers will, of course, continue to include customary restrictions and warnings 
related to warranties and safety. 
239.  CHARLES WHEELAN, NAKED ECONOMICS: UNDRESSING THE DISMAL SCIENCE 11–13 
(2002) (discussing the idea that companies are constantly trying to maximize profits and to do that they 
need to produce things that add value to the consumer so that she will be willing to pay higher prices). 
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commercial use of the devices by consumers who bought for personal use. 
They will restrict modification of the devices. They will restrict purchasing 
parts or service for the devices from sources other than the producers. They 
will restrict the ability of their devices to interoperate with devices from 
other manufacturers. They will restrict the right to comment negatively on 
the devices. Fourth, they will scrupulously enforce these restrictive 
licensing agreements.240 
Why will device producers place all of these restrictions in software 
licenses? The answer of those raising the alarm seems to be simply because 
they can.241 Those worried about software license misuse in regards to the 
Internet of Things assume that manufacturers will always want to be as 
restrictive as possible by default. This assumption lacks foundation. In this 
Part, we show that much of the time, it is not advantageous to producers to 
place onerous restrictions on the use of their devices. Market pressures for 
the most part will limit the use of restrictive licenses to situations in which 
they are likely to facilitate price discrimination that will both enable lower-
value users to buy the products and enhance total welfare, if done properly. 
Notwithstanding certain parades of horribles offered by some 
commentators, most producers will not utilize software licensing to restrict 
use of their products.242 The reason is that it would cost producers money to 
do so. A consumer values a product according to the total value of the uses 
he can make of it.243 If a producer narrows the use of its goods, then to the 
extent consumers value those restricted uses, they will be willing to pay 
less, and sales will be hurt. A producer will only limit use in cases in which 
it can make up the net present value of the decline in sales and prices 
caused by its use restrictions. Thus, for the most part, a producer will not 
impose limitations.244 
 
240.  See the discussion of restrictions in car software licenses in note 244, infra. 
241.  See infra text accompanying note 244.  
242.  Of course such manufacturers will continue to have license requirements for the warranty to 
be honored, and they will try to restrict misuse of the product that may result in tort liability, but these 
restrictions and warnings are independent of the rights given to software producers to restrict use via 
licenses to the copyrights for software contained in devices. 
243.  This includes aesthetic use, when applicable. 
244.  Take, for instance, the market for consumer cars. If a car manufacturer restricted the ability 
of consumers to let others drive, resell, modify, or independently service the car, consumers would find 
the car less valuable, and therefore would not be willing to pay as much for it. In addition, competitors 
could compete by selling cars without these restrictions and win business from consumers who do not 
like the restrictions. This will serve to discipline any manufacturer who seeks to restrict use of its 
products without good reason. The debate has recently heated up about the status of cars in the Internet 
of Things, with some car manufacturers seeking to restrict consumers from repairing and modifying 
their vehicles. See Lily Hay Newman, Who Owns the Software in the Car You Bought?, SLATE (May 
22, 2015, 2:37 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2015/05/22/gm_and_john_deere 
_say_they_still_own_the_software_in_cars_customers_buy.html. Car manufacturers cite safety and 
regulatory concerns about doing otherwise. See Pete Bigelow, Automakers to Gearheads: Stop 
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On the other hand, producers can use restraints arising from software 
licenses in a number of beneficial ways. Producers may restrict use to 
achieve selling fractional rights to products, metering of use,245 financing of 
purchases, risk sharing, and price discrimination. A producer can use 
software license restraints to facilitate selling fractions of a durable good. 
One example of this is car leases. A car lease allows the lessee to purchase 
the right to use a car for a prescribed period of time, often three years.246 At 
the end of that time, the lessee simply returns the car to the lessor, and the 
lessor takes on the cost of reselling the car to get the rest of the value from 
it. Thus, the car seller utilizes leases, complete with their restriction of 
ownership to a prescribed amount of time and mileage, to sell to consumers 
who want to drive new cars but cannot afford to buy them outright. The 
buyer gets to drive a new car with certain restrictions, and the seller gets to 
sell part of the rights to the car (the right to use it for a set period of time 
 
Repairing Cars, AUTOBLOG (Apr. 20, 2015, 10:31 AM), 
http://www.autoblog.com/2015/04/20/automakers-gearheads-car-repairs/. Some critical voices have 
called for changes to the DMCA to mandate greater consumer control. See Kit Walsh, Automakers Say 
You Don’t Really Own Your Car, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Apr. 3, 2015), 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/04/automakers-say-you-dont-really-own-your-car; Kyle Wiens, We 
Can’t Let John Deere Destroy the Very Idea of Ownership, WIRED MAG. (Apr. 21, 2015, 9:00 AM), 
http://www.wired.com/2015/04/dmca-ownership-john-deere/. One scholar has argued that 
manufacturers’ greater control over products post-sale may increase their legal liability in some 
settings. See Bryant Walker Smith, Proximity-Driven Liability, 102 GEO. L.J. 1777 (2014). This point 
has received attention lately in the context of white hat hackers using security flaws to control cars 
remotely. See Andy Greenberg, Hackers Remotely Kill a Jeep on the Highway—With Me in It, WIRED 
MAG. (July 21, 2015, 6:00 AM), http://www.wired.com/2015/07/hackers-remotely-kill-jeep-highway/; 
Nicole Perlroth, Security Researchers Find a Way to Hack Cars, N.Y. TIMES BITS (July 21, 2015, 2:32 
PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/07/21/security-researchers-find-a-way-to-hack-cars/?_r=0. 
One recent major story that has highlighted the question of consumers’ relationship with car software 
involves Volkswagen’s cheating on emissions tests via car software. See Alex Davies, The EPA 
Opposes Rules that Could’ve Exposed VW’s Cheating, WIRED, Sept. 18, 2015, 
http://www.wired.com/2015/09/epa-opposes-rules-couldve-exposed-vws-cheating/; Jim Dwyer, 
Volkswagen’s Diesel Fraud Makes Critic of Secret Code a Prophet, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2015, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/23/nyregion/volkswagens-diesel-fraud-makes-critic-of-secret-code-a-
prophet.html?_r=0; Andrew Morriss, Letter to the Editor, What VW Knew, ECONOMIST, Oct. 10, 2015, 
http://www.economist.com/news/letters/21672008-letters-editor; Tim Fernholz, Draconian US 
Copyright Rules Made It Easier for Volkswagen to Cheat, QUARTZ, Sept. 23, 2015, 
http://qz.com/509418/draconian-us-copyright-rules-made-it-easier-for-volkswagen-to-cheat/; James 
Grimmelmann, Harry Potter and the Mysterious Defeat Device, SLATE, Sept. 22, 2015, 
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2015/09/volkswagen_s_cheating_emissions_soft
ware_and_the_threat_of_black_boxes.html; Zeynep Tufekci, Volkswagen and the Era of Cheating 
Software, N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/24/opinion/volkswagen-and-
the-era-of-cheating-software.html?r=0. 
245.  For explanations of metering, see Tim Sommer, OMTCO, Top 200 SAM Terms – A 
Glossary of Software Asset Management Terms 18–19 (2013), http://omtco.eu/wp-content/uploads/ 
OMTCO-Top-200-SAM-Terms-A-Glossary-Of-Software-Asset-Management-And-Licensing-
Terms.pdf; Software Metering, MICROSOFT SYSTEM CENTER, https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/ 
library/cc181604.aspx (last visited Sept. 28, 2015). 
246.  Philip Reed, Four Ways to Spot a Good Lease, EDMUNDS.COM, Feb. 7, 2012, 
http://www.edmunds.com/car-leasing/four-ways-to-spot-a-good-lease.html. 
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and distance) to someone who otherwise may not have been able to afford a 
new car. 
Manufacturers can also use restrictive software licenses to provide 
consumer financing for purchases. Smartphones are often sold on a 
financing plan.247 Typically, a buyer pays some amount up front, say 
$200.248 The buyer will then pay the remaining price over time, often as 
part of the price of the buyer’s mobile phone plan. This financing benefits 
consumers, and the costs of enforcing the financing are low because the 
seller typically locks the phone to a particular mobile phone carrier. That 
carrier can suspend service if the additional payments are not made. 
Because the phone cannot be used on any other carrier’s network until it is 
unlocked, consumers will not be able to profitably abscond with phones 
that they have not paid off. Once the phones are paid off, the mobile phone 
carrier unlocks the phone so that the user may use the phone without 
restriction.249 
Manufacturers can further use software licenses to tie parts and 
services to the product being sold. There are numerous examples of this. 
Printer manufacturers often use both technology and restrictive licenses to 
require consumers to buy printer ink cartridges from the manufacturer.250 
Likewise, Keurig has used technology to tie the use of its K-cup coffee 
inserts to Keurig coffee machines.251 Other manufacturers may use 
software licensing in place of technology to accomplish a similar 
 
247.  For a description of a number of available options in this area, see Lisa Gerstner, Best Cell-
Phone Plans for Every Type of User, YAHOO! FINANCE (Oct. 10, 2014, 6:00 PM), http://finance.yahoo. 
com/news/best-cell-phone-plans-every-182328257.html. 
248.  Some plans require as little as $0 down. See, e.g., Early Upgrade Option, U.S. CELLULAR, 
http://www.uscellular.com/cell-phones/device-financing.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2015). 
249.  Cell phones now also have to be unlocked in some situations as a matter of law. For a 
discussion of the enactment of related legislation, see Marguerite Reardon, President Signs Cell Phone 
Unlocking Bill into Law, CNET (Aug. 1, 2014, 2:42 PM), http://www.cnet.com/news/president-signs-
cell-phone-unlocking-bill-into-law/. 
250.  John C. Dvorak, The Secret Printer Companies Are Keeping from You, PC MAG. (Sept. 6, 
2012), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2409373,00.asp. See also Tim Cushing, Your Toner Is 
No Good Here: Region-Coding Ink Cartridges. . . For the Customers, TECHDIRT, Aug. 20, 2015, 
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20150815/02480731963/your-toner-is-no-good-here-region-coding-
ink-cartridges-customers.shtml. Some manufacturers are now eliminating the need for cartridges 
altogether. See David Pogue, Review: New Inkjet Printers Eliminate Cartridges, Save You $500 a Year, 
YAHOO! TECH, Aug. 9, 2015, https://www.yahoo.com/tech/review-epsons-new-inkjet-printers-
eliminate-125950545829.html?soc_src=social-sh&soc_trk=fb. 
251.  Keurig’s tying of pods to its coffee machines provoked both consumer backlash and 
circumvention techniques. See Ry Crist, Keurig 2.0 Brews up DRM to Freeze Out Copycat Cups, CNET 
(Mar. 3, 2014, 2:15 PM), http://www.cnet.com/news/keurig-2-0-brews-up-drm-to-freeze-out-copycat-
cups/. In the end, the cost in public goodwill became too great, and Keurig had to abandon its price 
discrimination scheme. Alex Hern, Keurig Takes Steps Towards Abandoning Coffee-Pod DRM, 
GUARDIAN (May 11, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/may/11/keurig-takes-steps-
towards-abandoning-coffee-pod-drm. 
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purpose.252 Tying can be used to provide consumer financing.253 For 
instance, a seller of computer printers may sell the printer for below cost, 
but the cartridges for above cost. This would allow consumers to 
effectively pay the price of the printers and cartridges over time. Tying can 
also serve to share risk.254 For example, if a manufacturer of petroleum 
exploration equipment sells its machines below cost and the parts for the 
machines above cost, then companies uncertain as to whether they will earn 
enough money to pay for the machine will pay less, while successful 
companies who can afford it will pay more. Tying works similarly when it 
comes to price discrimination.255 If a manufacturer has market power such 
that it can price above cost, it can tie sales of the replacement parts for its 
product to sales of the product. It can price the product at cost and the 
replacement parts above cost. Tying cartridges to printers again provides an 
example. If the printers are sold at cost, and the cartridges above cost, then 
those who use the machine more will pay more over the life of the 
machine.256 Because intensity of use probably correlates fairly well with 
how much the consumer values the product, this can be an effective way to 
price discriminate.257 
Producers can also price discriminate simply by offering different 
prices for the good to different consumers, depending on estimates of 
willingness to pay.258 This, combined with restraints on alienation and 
effective monitoring, could allow software companies to sell software 
licenses at individualized prices based on estimates of reservation prices. 
That would increase total welfare compared to monopoly pricing, or even 
to competitive market pricing, because it would allow for selling the goods 
at marginal cost of distribution to those willing to pay only that amount. 
But it would also look like naked price hikes for the wealthy and those who 
 
252.  Whether this practice is legal is a question pending in the Federal Circuit as of this writing. 
See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Impression Products, Inc., 785 F.3d 565 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
253.  Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 502 (1992) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
254.  Id. at 478 (majority opinion). 
255.  Id. at 476. 
256.  See Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc. 547 U.S. 28, 44–45 (2006). 
257.  See id. at 44. 
258.  The best current example of collecting information so as to price discriminate nearly 
perfectly is probably found in higher education. Universities get very detailed information on a family’s 
ability to pay for a student’s education, including income, savings, and how many other children are in 
school. The universities then use this to set the discount from their sticker price by offering a 
combination of loans, grants, and work-study programs. Universities are thus able to charge each 
student an individualized price, so as to maximize revenue according to ability to pay. See Frederick G. 
Tiffany & Jeff A. Ankrom, The Competitive Use of Price Discrimination by Colleges, 1 EASTERN 
ECON. J. 99–110 (1998); Robert A. Lawson & Ann Zerkle, Price Discrimination in College Tuition: An 
Empirical Case Study, 5 J. OF ECON AND FINANCE EDU. 1–7 (2006), http://www.economics-
finance.org/jefe/econ/Lawsonpaper.pdf. 
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highly value the software. Charging consumers more simply because they 
are willing to pay more tends to anger customers, notwithstanding its 
overall efficiency.259 Accordingly, it is unlikely that companies would 
engage in naked price discrimination on a person-by-person basis. 
Companies may, however, start with a high price for the software, and then 
come up with “promotional offers,” points towards purchases, or other 
clever ways of discounting the software according to estimates of 
reservation prices. It is possible that due to public backlash and 
competition, software sellers will continue to be able to make only rough 
cuts in terms of price discrimination. But to the extent that they are able to 
make software pricing more fine-grained, total welfare should increase, and 
more consumers should be able to purchase desired software. 
Another worry about the use of restrictive software license conditions 
attached to durable consumer goods is that manufacturers of these goods 
will use the restrictions to create and get a monopoly profit by preventing 
consumers from buying service or replacement parts from competitors.260 
For instance, a car manufacturer might include a license restriction on 
having the car serviced anywhere besides official dealerships. The 
manufacturer and dealer could then split the profits from increasing the 
price of service above the market price. But basic economics shows that 
manufacturers and dealers will not be able to succeed in this scheme to 
have consumers pay more for owning a car so long as the market generally 
prices in the cost of service to the overall price of owning and using the 
car.261 Different brands of car certainly have different reputations for how 
expensive they are to service and maintain.262 So unless market participants 
overall fail to see that manufacturers are tying sales of goods to expensive 
service or parts, this scheme should be corrected adequately in the long run 
by information in the market and by competition. Moreover, so long as 
consumers consider costs to own durable goods as well as the initial 
 
259.  See Xia & Monroe, supra note 113. 
260.  See supra note 252.  
261.  The dissenting opinion in Kodak referred to this as “life-cycle pricing” and argued that so 
long as the market generally included the price of ownership in the decision to buy a car, manufacturers 
could not get a double monopoly profit by tying service to sales of cars. Eastman Kodak Co., 504 U.S. 
at 496 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
262.  A number of people and organizations collect and distribute data on the cost of ownership 
of cars and other durable goods over time. See, e.g., New & Used Car Reviews & Ratings, CONSUMER 
REPORTS, http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/cars/index.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2015); New & 
Used Car Price Values, KELLEY BLUE BOOK, http://www.kbb.com (last visited Sept. 28, 2015); New 
Cars, Used Cars, Car Reviews and Pricing, EDMUNDS, http://www.edmunds.com/ (last visited Sept. 28, 
2015). 
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purchase price, it is in the interest of the manufacturer to have consumers 
use the least expensive sufficient service and parts available.263 
While a good deal of the price discrimination described above could be 
accomplished with purchase contracts, software licenses are superior to 
purchase contracts when it comes to enforcing restrictions on the use of 
products containing the software at issue. Contract enforcement is 
expensive, cannot be used against downstream third parties, and results at 
best in contract damages, which may not be high. Software licenses and 
monitoring, however, make it easy to protect restrictions from arbitrage. 
First, software licenses run with the software or software-enabled device, 
and thus restrict downstream purchasers. Second, when software that is part 
of a device checks in with the software company—as it will do to receive 
updates—and as devices increasingly communicate with users and each 
other, the company will be able to limit or disable the software until any 
breach of the restrictions is cured. Because compliance with software 
license restrictions can increasingly be monitored and enforced directly by 
software companies, and because information about restrictions can be 
stored in the device software itself, the policy reasons for not allowing 
restraints on use and alienation for personal property largely do not apply 
to software licenses. The information cost problem is largely solved by the 
fact that the restrictions can ride with the software and be displayed to users 
on demand. Restrictions can also be listed on the Internet.264 Similarly, the 
transaction cost problem of enforcing restrictions on personal property 
 
263.  For instance, say that a car buyer is willing to pay $40,000 for a car over five years. If the 
cost of service for the car averages $1,500 per year, then the buyer will only be willing to pay $32,500 
for the initial purchase price. The buyer actually would be willing to pay a bit of a higher initial 
purchase price because the net present value of $1,500 per year for five years is less than $7,500, but for 
the sake of simplicity, we will not use net present value in this simple example. Assume further that the 
$1,500 yearly maintenance price is for maintenance at the dealership, and that the cost of the 
maintenance to the dealer is only $1,000 per year. Even if the manufacturer gets half of the monopoly 
maintenance profits via charging inflated prices for parts, it is only getting a total of an extra $1,250 
over five years. If instead the manufacturer allowed the car to be serviced anywhere using compatible 
parts, then assuming the competitive price for service is $1,000 per year, the buyer would now be 
willing to pay $35,000 for the initial purchase price. The manufacturer would get all of this money, and 
so would be better off than by overcharging for parts over five years. The situation is even better for the 
manufacturer if independent providers can offer parts and service at lower prices than the manufacturer 
or its dealers. If independent part makers and service stations can service the car for only $500 per year, 
then the manufacturer can stop making replacement parts, save the money from that, and also have a 
buyer who is willing to pay $37,500 for the initial purchase price. Thus, it is not in the manufacturer’s 
interest to prevent lower-price complementary parts from being sold by competitors. So long as the 
manufacturer has some market power, it can make more money up front if the consumer knows she will 
have to pay less over the life of the product. In competitive markets, the manufacturer will also be 
forced to allow cheaper service options, because otherwise the total cost of ownership of its cars will 
not be competitive with other carmakers. 
264.  For a discussion of the relationship between information costs and registries, see Abraham 
Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Of Property and Information (Univ. of Pa. Inst. for Law & Econ. 
Research, Paper No. 15-29), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2632082. 
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largely disappears because software companies can use self-help to enforce 
the restrictions. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In this Article we examined the history of the disallowance of equitable 
servitudes in personal property and concluded that the reasons that 
restraints on personal property were generally disfavored—mainly 
problems with transaction costs and information costs—for the most part 
do not apply to software and software-enabled goods. We studied the 
history of treating transfers of software as license events rather than sales, 
and showed that given the modern evolution of software, characterizing the 
transactions as licenses is appropriate. We showed the particular social 
benefits of fine-grained price discrimination for software distribution. We 
also analyzed how manufacturers are likely to use restrictive software 
licenses to price discriminate in selling the Internet-connected consumer 
goods that will compose the coming Internet of Things. While the potential 
increase in social welfare is not as great from more perfect price 
discrimination in selling consumer goods as it is in licensing pure software, 
the Article showed that use of restrictive licenses to facilitate price 
discrimination in selling consumer goods is likely to be neutral or socially 
beneficial overall. Accordingly, calls for changes to laws and judicial 
interpretations to prevent the use of restrictive software licenses to facilitate 
price discrimination are misplaced. If anything, the law will increase social 
welfare by facilitating more fine-grained price discrimination for software 
and software-enabled devices. 
